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ABSTRACT. This chapter offers a revenge-free solution to the liar paradox and presents a 
formal representation of truth in, or for, a natural language like English, which proposes to show 
both why (and how) truth is coherent and how it appears to be incoherent, while preserving 
classical logic and most principles that some philosophers have taken to be central to the concept 
of truth and our use of that notion. The chapter argues that, by using a truth operator rather than 
truth predicate, it is possible to provide a coherent, model-theoretic representation of truth with 
various desirable features. After investigating what features of liar sentences are responsible for 
their paradoxicality, the chapter identifies the logic as the normal modal logic KT4M (= S4M). 
Drawing on the structure of KT4M (=S4M), the author proposes that, pace deflationism, truth 
has content, that the content of truth is bivalence, and that the notions of both truth and bivalence 
are semideterminable. 
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The guiding question for this chapter is what modal system with a sentential truth-operator—if 
any—would capture the notion of truth in a semantically closed natural language. Or, more 
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modestly, what modal system with a sentential truth-operator—if any—would capture the 
notion of truth in the propositional fragment of a semantically closed natural language? As a 
starting point toward an answer, I consider the basic features of liar sentences that, combined, 
create the liar paradox and that threaten the consistency of the notion of truth. Through 
distilling the structure from these features, and separating pragmatic from nonpragmatic 
elements, I obtain the building blocks for a possible-world semantics that leads to the normal 
modal logic KT4M (or S4M or S4.1). This logic, which so far has gained little attention, 
makes it possible to represent truth in the propositional fragment of natural language as a 
coherent notion. It also provides some additional insight into the notion of truth, such as that, 
pace deflationism, truth does have content and that this content is bivalence; moreover that it 
appears that the sets of true sentences and of bivalent sentences are semi-determinable on the 
propositional fragment of natural language. Accordingly, I offer KT4M as the logic of 
semantic modalities, with truth as semantic necessity and bivalence as semantic 
noncontingency. What I suggest is not an axiomatic theory of truth.  
  
The route from the Liar to KT4M includes the following way-posts. The paradoxical 
liar sentences lie at the intersection of three sentential features: First, their ascription of a 
semantic value, second, their self-reference, and third, their predicating something that is 
incompatible with truth. Individually and in pairs any of these features are unproblematic, and 
it is an indication of the richness of natural languages that they include all three. Things go 
awry when the three features are exemplified in the same sentence (or in a plurality of 
sentences related by anaphora or a successor function). 
Sentences (72) that self-ascribe a semantic value, such as the liar sentence1 
 
(L) This sentence is false 
 
and the truth-teller sentence 
                                                          
1 Why do I not use (Luntrue) ‘This sentence is untrue’ as the liar sentence? The answer will become clear later. 
(Luntrue) is discussed in 4.11. Why do I not use a sentence like (L101) ‘The sentence written on the board in room 
101 expresses a false statement’ as an example of a liar sentence? The answer is brevity. Throughout, you should 
be able to replace (L) by (L101), and (T) by a corresponding (T101) without any philosophically significant 
change in what I say. 
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(T) This sentence is true 
 
are conceptually bistable on account of salience (section 4.2). Sentences that self-ascribe a 
semantic value also display a context sensitivity that is based on the fact that the designation 
of their subject expression is an object that itself has truth conditions. Such context sensitivity 
is displayed both by (L) and by (T) (section 4.4). Sentences that self-ascribe a semantic value 
that is incompatible with truth, such as (L), display in addition to context sensitivity a kind of 
unsavoury assessment sensitivity (section 4.5). This assessment sensitivity has as a 
consequence that the appropriate epistemic position toward liar sentences is an—iterating—
suspension of judgment concerning their semantic value (section 4.6). The combination of the 
structural features of salience-based bistability, context sensitivity, and assessment sensitivity 
of liar sentences leads to the modal system KT4M as the correct choice for modeling truth as a 
coherent feature of natural language. It provides informal correlates to the axioms of KT4M as 
well as the basic elements for an interpretation of the corresponding Kripke semantics (section 
4.7-4.9). The paradoxicality of the Liar finds an explanation in the confusion of an elusive 
pragmatic element with a semantic or logical one in what is known as the liar property, and it 
is dissolved in a revenge-proof manner (section 4.10). 
The chapter is something of a pioneer piece, with rough edges and uncharted trails. It 
invites the reader to explore thinking about truth in (yet) a(nother) new way. This 
notwithstanding, it draws upon numerous aspects of established approaches to the Liar, and 
displays similarities, some of them strong, to various well-known theories of truth. It provides 
functional analogues for Kripke’s fixed points and builds on Herzberger’s and Kripke’s notion 
of ungroundedness by giving it a contextualist explanation. It shares with more recent 
axiomatic theories and revisionist theories of truth their desire to keep logic classical, 
semantics bivalent, and truth untyped, as well as their use of modal(-like) axioms to represent 
(some of) the structure of truth. Its closest cousin among well-established axiomatic theories 
of truth is Kripke-Feferman, and its closest revisionist cousin, and possibly closest relative 
altogether, is Herzberger. Thus, the identification of bivalence as the content of truth may 
already be implicit in Herzberger 1982a. Moreover, this chapter offers as alternative to 
Herzberger’s semantic revision steps for the Liar a pragmatic oscillation whose significance is 
bound up with its occurrence in arguments. The pragmatic oscillation can be linked to Barwise 
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and (73) Etchemendy’s ‘simply false’ and ‘simply true’, but instead of a blunt ambiguity, I 
suggest a shift in conceptual salience. The chapter adopts McGee’s approach of treating truth 
as a sentential operator, but without giving rise to a revenge problem—or so I hope. Like van 
Fraassen’s supervaluationist fixed-point models of truth, it separates bivalence and the law of 
excluded middle, but unlike his theory, it retains compositionality and does not entail a third 
semantic value. The chapter also picks up on—and turns around—recent suggestions that 
provide a possible-world semantics for truth and treat necessity and truth in similar ways 
(Leitgeb 2003; Halbach 2003; Halbach, Leitgeb, and Welch 2005) and shares with Billon 
2011 the treatment of arguments as contexts. Beyond the amalgamation of all these factors 
into one theory, there are the features mentioned in the first two paragraphs. 
Many questions that arise for theories of truth generally are not, or hardly, touched 
upon in this chapter: these include related semantic paradoxes such as Curry’s and Yablo’s, 
the Gödelized Liar (which gets its own paper!), and the relations to quantified truth-ascriptions 
and propositional attitude ascriptions. This is neither to say that answers to these questions 
cannot be given nor that they will not be given. Finally, the chapter is deliberately written in 
such a way that it is accessible to nonmathematicians and it keeps formal elements to a 
minimum. 
 
4.1. Truth Predicate and Truth Operator 
In natural language, there are two main uses of the expression ‘true’ with which truth is 
ascribed to a suitable truth-bearer: a predicative use, as in ‘that’s true’, ‘the Barcan Formula is 
true’, ‘whatever she says is true’, and a sentential-operator use, as in ‘it is true that it is 
raining’, ‘it is true that he is both charming and annoying’. Truth as a predicate commonly 
requires either a noun like ‘sentence’, ‘proposition’, etc., or a name or description for an 
instance of a sentence, proposition, etc., or is anaphoric. Truth as a sentential operator 
generally neither requires nor allows these. There is no straightforward translation mechanism 
from one natural-language use to the other. Biconditionals such as ‘the sentence ‘⌜S⌝’ is true 
(where ‘⌜S⌝’ is the name of the sentence abbreviated as S) ↔ It is true that S’ provide no more 
than a rough guide for how to move between the two kinds of truth ascription.2 Predicatively 
                                                          
2 I agree with Halbach 2003, p. 79, that “there is hardly any essential syntactical difference in English between 
‘true’ and ‘necessary’, that is, replacing a used occurrence of ‘true’ by ‘necessary’ in an English sentence usually 
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truth-ascribing sentences with noun phrases such as ‘That he is both charming and annoying is 
true’ can be translated into truth-operator sentences and vice versa. For present purposes, any 
difference between these two is treated as semantically irrelevant. 
In the proposed formalization of truth, truth is treated not as a predicate but as a 
sentential operator. The main reason is that this brings out some significant (74) structural 
features of truth in a straightforward manner. It makes it possible to put forward, for a 
language that is semantically closed in that it contains its own truth predicates or truth 
operators, the following: a coherent, model-theoretic representation of truth that preserves 
classical logic, does not go beyond normal modal logic, and in which liar sentences are 
consistent.  
To be very clear: my treatment of truth ascription with a truth operator for truth in 
natural language is not meant to suggest that the natural-language use of a truth operator is in 
any way superior or ‘closer to the truth’ than that of a truth predicate. The structure of truth 
which I aim to define modally is meant to capture equally the operator use and the predicate 
use in natural-language discourse. Counter to axiomatic theories of truth (which favour a truth-
predicate), I suggest that the structure of truth itself disqualifies there being a semantic Liar 
property, and the way it does so is best expressed with a truth operator.  In my view, the 
reasons why speakers use one or the other are generally pragmatic. Linguistic exploration of 
the contrasting natural-language uses of ‘it is true that . . . , ‘. . . is true’, ‘truth’, ‘. . . is false’, 
etc., may prove enlightening in various ways, but I believe that their usefulness to a solution of 
the semantic paradoxes is restricted. 
 
4.2. Perceptual Multistability  
                                                                                                                                                                                      
will yield again a sentence and vice versa.” Where Halbach 2003 and Halbach, Leitgeb, and Welch 2005 suggest 
treating necessity as a predicate, I suggest treating truth as an operator that attaches to what is said in a sentence. I 
give a rough idea how this works. The sentence ‘the sentence “snow is white” is true’ is short for ‘the sentence 
“snow is white” says that snow is white and it is true that snow is white.’ The sentence “Fermat’s last Theorem is 
true” is short for ‘Fermat’s Last Theorem says that no three positive integers … and it is true that no three 
positive integers… .’ The sentence ‘Everything the pope says is true’ is short for ‘for all sayable things p (where 
p is a sentential variable), if the pope says (that) p, then it is true that p.’ Or alternatively conjunctively ‘If the 
pope says that grass is green, it is true that grass is green and if the pope says that snow is white, it is true that 
snow is white, …’ More complex sentences and propositional attitude ascriptions are dealt with in the same 
general manner. 
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The topic of the next two sections is multistability. In this section I suggest that sentences that 
self-ascribe a semantic value are conceptually multistable. I explain the notion of conceptual 
multistability by way of the notion of perceptual multistability. That is, I use the analogy to 
perceptual multistability heuristically, to aid the reader in getting an understanding of what 
conceptual multistability is. (The following is not an argument by analogy.) 
 
 
The (75) duck-rabbit (or rather duck-hare) illusion is a bistable perceptual 
phenomenon. It is an instance of a figure, or more generally a visual pattern, that permits a 
Gestalt shift. You look at it. You see a duck, no doubt about it. You look at it some more. 
Suddenly, instead you see a rabbit—then possibly again a duck. But you never see both at a 
time. Perceptual phenomena like the duck-rabbit illusion are called multistable, since they 
allow a perceiver to experience in succession two or more different and incompatible stable 
percepts or Gestalts, resulting from a so-called perceptual reversal or Gestalt shift. The 
incompatibility is on the side of the perceiver: the figure itself may depict both a duck and a 
rabbit, but the perceiver cannot simultaneously see (the depiction of) a duck and a rabbit. (The 
incompatibility seems to be a brute fact of perception. The details are irrelevant here.) Other 
examples of perceptual multistability are the Necker cube, the stacked cubes, the mother-
father-daughter figure and the spinning dancer—a kinetic multistable figure.43 
Here are 10 characteristics that all multistable perceptual illusions seem to share. 
(a) Which Gestalt one sees, or sees first, may depend on multiple factors, including 
simultaneous or preceding circumstantial factors. 
(b) In ordinary circumstances, whether a person sees the one Gestalt (a duck), or 
the other (a rabbit), or experiences a Gestalt shift from one to another, the 
person cannot be faulted for what they (say they) see. If someone is presented 
with a range of sketched animal representations on cards, with a duck-rabbit 
                                                          
3
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spinning_Dancer.  
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card snuck in, and is asked to say for each card what animal it shows and then 
move on to the next card, we have no reason to say that someone who says ‘a 
rabbit’ or someone who says ‘a duck’ when faced with the duck-rabbit card is 
mistaken. Someone saying ‘a rabbit when looked at one way, a duck looked at 
another way’ would not be mistaken either. 
(c) Likewise, a person cannot be faulted if, seeing one or the other Gestalt, they 
make some inferential observations: when you see the duck, you can make the 
inferential observation that part of the figure or drawing you see depicts a beak. 
(d) Some people only see one Gestalt and experience no Gestalt shift. In such 
cases, one can sometimes prompt a Gestalt shift in the person’s perception, e.g., 
by pointing out some features of the alternative Gestalt. One may be able to 
make someone who only sees the rabbit see the duck by saying ‘don’t you see 
the beak?’   
(e) Such prompts do not by themselves warrant that the perceiver ‘catches on’ and 
sees the alternative Gestalt. Multistable perceptual illusions can be stubborn, 
and are so to different degrees. With some illusions, for some people it remains 
impossible, or takes very long, to reverse the Gestalt, even if they are told what 
the second stable Gestalt is (or depicts). The Necker cube is a good example:   
 
Even better is the spinning dancer. (76) 
(f) As a rule, one or more elements in the multistable figure do double duty: one 
and the same part of the figure may depict one thing relative to one stable 
percept, another relative to the other—e.g., a beak and a pair of ears. 
(g) In multistable perceptual phenomena each of their stable percepts is in some 
respect deficient—for example, since something has been left out (color, 
shading or missing details, etc.); or due to the two-dimensionality of the 
representation of something three-dimensional. 
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(h) Perceptual multistability can be removed, e.g., by adding visual elements. In the 
case of the duck-rabbit illusion some feather details could be added. Here is an 
example with the mother-father-daughter figure that illustrates possibilities of 
the removal of multistability by adding detail: 
 
 
 
(i) Someone’s experience of a Gestalt shift is in several respects independent of 
their having a theoretical grasp of it. It is perfectly possible to experience a 
Gestalt shift either without having a concept of multistable perception; or 
without having concepts of the Gestalts depicted (one may notice no more than 
a bird-to-mammal shift, or one-animal-to-another shift); or one may even be 
unaware that one experienced a shift of Gestalt. (The spinning dancer may at 
some point be perceived spinning counterclockwise instead of clockwise 
without the observer ever contemplating which way the figure spins, and 
consequently missing that it ‘changed direction’.) (77) 
(j) As a result of (i), it may be difficult for us to ascertain which of two Gestalts in 
a bistable figure someone perceives; they may lack the ability to describe, or 
even fully understand, what it is they perceive. Someone may experience a 
Gestalt shift with the stacked cubes illusion, without ever having considered 
that they are looking at a figure that depicts two different (in arrangement and 
number) stacks of cubes, or any cubes at all. 
 
4.3. The Multistability of Sentences That Self-Ascribe a Semantic Value 
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In parallel with the notion of perceptual multistability one can institute a notion of conceptual 
multistability.
4 5 Simple structural ambiguities make straightforward cases of conceptual 
multistability. Take (TEL) ‘I saw the woman with the telescope’. Without a context given, you 
may ‘read’ the sentence in one way (i) (the speaker had the telescope) or another (ii) (the 
woman had the telescope). Or (iii) you may shift from one reading to the other. The 
incompatibility is on the side of the ‘reader’: the sentence itself can be used to express either 
reading, but the reader cannot simultaneously read it both ways. (This potential for 
incompatible readings seems to be a brute fact of linguistic representation of natural 
languages.) It is left to the interested reader to verify that one can observe 10 characteristics 
that match those of perceptual multistability. 
 
Conceptual multistability is not restricted to structural (and lexical) ambiguity. 
Sentences that predicatively self-ascribe a semantic value are also conceptually multistable, if 
less obviously so. Instead of a shift between reading one of two or more possible contents of a 
sentence, there is a shift between focus on one of two possible aspects of a sentence, with no 
change of content, or, more precisely, a shift between what is salient in that sentence. (To 
indicate that this multistability is a matter of salience of content, not content, I replace the 
expression ‘to read’ and its cognates that I used for ambiguities with ‘to understand’ and its 
cognates.) Salience is a pragmatic element of a more elusive kind than ambiguity.
56 Still, as an 
aid to grasping this salience-based notion of Gestalt shifts, one can think of Barwise and 
Etchemendy’s ambiguity-based situation shifts, or of the revision steps in Herzberger’s 
revision semantics. 
Semantic-value-self-ascribing atomic sentences (i) can be understood designationally 
as that which is denoted by the designator of a semantic-value-self-ascribing sentence, where 
this denotation is left unanalyzed (beyond its being syntactically composed of a predicate and 
a designator); or (ii) they can be understood as sentences that ascribe a truth value; again, (iii) 
                                                          
4 More accurately, this would be the potential for shifts in the perceptual salience of linguistic stimuli. 
5 In this chapter I do not further specify this pragmatic element of attention or focus and perceptual salience of 
linguistic stimuli. The details are in part empirical. (For an overview of some recent research see Summerfield 
and Egner 2009.) Let it suffice to say that what I have in mind is neither a difference in force nor one in 
presuppositions nor one in implicatures. 
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it is possible to shift from one understanding to the other. Liar and truth-teller sentences are 
bistable sentences of this sort. 
The (78) alternative Gestalts of such bistable sentences are less easily detected than in 
the case of the ambiguity of (TEL). They are best made apparent contextually; that is, by 
means of typical contexts in which each will—almost certainly—occur. The most effective 
linguistic contexts are arguments. For understanding (i), consider the following derivation: 
 
1. (L) is true. assumption 
2. (L) is false. 1, semantic descent 
   
Here, in order to see that and how 2 is derived in this derivation, one needs to think of 2—at 
least temporarily—as that which is denoted by the designator in 1. Or take 
 
1. (L) is false. assumption 
2. (L) is true. 1, semantic ascent 
   
Here, in order to see that and how 2 is derived in this derivation, one needs to think of, and 
thus make use of, 1 as that which is denoted by the designator in 2. For the ascriptional option, 
(ii), consider the following derivation: 
 
1. (L) is false. assumption 
2. (L) is true. 1, semantic ascent 
3. Contradiction7 1, 2, principle of bivalence 
   
This is part of an informal version of the Liar. If you succeed in seeing the—presumed—
contradiction, then at least while moving to line 3, you have understood (L) in line 1, as 
ascriptional. You have made use of the fact that (L) self-ascribes a truth value. The liar 
paradox also (iii) provides us with an example of a conceptual Gestalt shift within an 
argument. Consider this informal version of the simple liar paradox (SLP): 
                                                          
6 There is no formal contradiction here. Rather, it results from the acceptance of the Principle of Bivalence. If 
instead of (L) one uses (Luntrue) ‘This sentence is untrue’, one gets a formal contradiction. A Gestalt shift is still 
required. 
Susanne Bobzien  Gestalt Shifts in the Liar Or Why KT4M is the Logic of Semantic Modalities 
11 
 
 
1. (L) is true. assumption 1 
2. (L) is false. 1, semantic descent 
3. If (L) is true, (L) is false. 1, 2, discharge assumption 1 
4. (L) is false. assumption 2 
5. (L) is true. 4, semantic ascent 
6. If (L) is false, (L) is true. 3, 4, discharge assumption 2 
7. (L) is true if and only if (L) is 
false. 
3, 6, definition ‘if and only 
if’ 
8. (L) is true or false, and not both. principle of bivalence 
9. Contradiction 7, 8 
 
Someone (79) who grasps (SLP) needs to understand ‘(L) is false’ (i) as the denotation of the 
designator of a semantic-value-ascribing sentence for the steps from 1 to 2 and from 4 to 5. 
They need to understand ‘(L) is false’ (ii) as ascribing a truth value for the step from 7 and 8 to 
9. A person who entertains (SLP) would thus experience at least one Gestalt shift somewhere 
between lines 1 and 9. 
As in the case of perceptual bistability, the incompatibility of (i) and (ii) is on the side 
of the person who entertains the sentence, e.g., as part of an argument. Sentence (L) lends 
itself to either understanding, but one cannot simultaneously entertain (L) in both ways. 
(Again, this potential for incompatible understandings seems to be a brute fact regarding 
semantic-value-self-ascribing sentences.) Again, the incompatibility at issue seems 
psychological. It appears to be psychologically impossible for us to simultaneously entertain 
both understandings. The following deliberation may illustrate this. Take  
 
1  (L) is false. 
 
 
 
 
Here (L) can be understood (i) as that which is denoted by ‘(L)’ in 1 or (ii) as 1. Now, if we 
entertained (i) and (ii) simultaneously, we would have to include the fact that what is denoted 
by ‘(L)’ in 1 is 1. Thus we would have instead of (1) 
 
1′ ‘(L) is false’ is false, 
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where (L) is understood simultaneously both (i) as what is denoted by ‘(L)’ and (ii) as 1′. Then 
we would have to include the fact that what is denoted by ‘(L)’ in 1′ is 1′. Thus we would have 
 
1″ ‘‘‘(L) is false’ is false’ is false’ is false. 
 
And so forth. Arguably, it is psychologically impossible to entertain this infinite item.8 
As with perceptual multistability, so with conceptual multistability, both the Gestalt 
understood, and the Gestalt shift, have to be experienced by the relevant individuals 
themselves. Evil neuroscientists aside, one cannot force someone to understand a sentence one 
way rather than the other, nor can one force them to experience a Gestalt shift. What one can 
do is provide trigger elements—as I just did. (It follows that I need to rely on your, the 
reader’s, cooperation.) 
Moreover, the salience-based bistability of semantic-value-self-ascribing sentences 
displays all ten characteristic features of multistability. Again, with (L) as example: 
(a) Whether you understand (L) (i) as designational or (ii) as ascriptional when you 
encounter it is likely to depend on various circumstantial factors, such as steps 
in arguments (see above). (80) 
(b) We would neither fault someone who understands (i), nor someone who 
understands (ii), nor someone who states that (L) can be understood both as (i) 
and as (ii). This can be seen from our acceptance of the arguments that 
illustrate each of these cases. 
(c) Someone would not be faulted if they inferred ‘(L) is false’ from ‘(L) is true’, 
using (i). Someone would not be faulted either, if they inferred ‘(L) is not true’ 
from ‘(L) is false’, using (ii). Nor would someone be faulted for pointing out 
that depending on how they understood the sentence, they could infer different 
things. 
(d) We may encounter someone who, on their own, managed only to understand 
(i), or (ii), but can experience the alternative upon prompting. 
                                                          
7 See Ryle (1951) for a related infinite iteration. 
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(e) It can be difficult for someone to shift Gestalt, if they are simply told of the two 
options, without context, or if they are simply told that (L) is conceptually 
multistable. 
(f) The element of the linguistic representation that does double duty is the whole 
sentence. Relative to the designational understanding (i), it is what is denoted 
by the subject expression of the sentence. Relative to the ascriptional 
understanding (ii), it is the sentence. 
(g) What is the deficiency of (each of) the two understandings?9 Usually, when we 
have a sentence, what is denoted by its subject expression and what truth value 
is ascribed to it come apart. Not so in semantic-value-self-ascribing sentences. 
They are—pragmatically—deficient in that they do not indicate which of these 
aspects is at issue. 
(h) We can remove the conceptual multistability of content aspect (or saliency) by 
adding explicitly whether the focus is on the sentence qua denotation of the 
subject expression or qua truth-value ascription. 
(i) In order to experience a Gestalt shift from (i) to (ii) or vice versa, someone 
would not need any knowledge either of content aspects (or saliency) or of 
predication or truth-value ascription; and moreover they may be unaware that 
they experienced a Gestalt shift. For instance, anyone who considers the liar 
paradox paradoxical experiences a conceptual Gestalt shift (see the simple liar 
paradox (SLP)). 
(j) As a result of (i), it may be difficult to ascertain in which Gestalt someone is 
understanding the sentence, as they may lack the ability to describe, or even 
comprehend, what their understanding is. 
So, sentences like (L) are conceptually bistable. This kind of salience-based bistability 
is present whenever a sentence self-ascribes a truth value. It is a consequence of the 
combination of self-reference and truth-value ascription. Thus we can also have bistability in 
(T). Since supposition of (T) does not lead to contradiction, the bistability is harder to detect. 
Compare the following two derivations: (81) 
 
                                                          
8 It is not the lack of semantic evaluability due to ungroundedness, for which see section 4.4. 
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1. (T) is true.   assumption 
2. (T) is true.   1, semantic descent  
 
1. (T) is true. assumption 
2. (T) is true. 1, semantic ascent 
 
The first derivation may evoke a descriptional understanding, the second an ascriptional 
understanding. Line 2 is the same in either case, but since it is derived in different ways, a 
reader would invoke different saliency for the understanding of either derivation. So (L) and 
(T) are both conceptually bistable. 
A comparison of the distinction between ambiguity and salience-based bistability with 
that between the duck-rabbit on the one hand and the Necker cube and spinning dancer on the 
other is instructive. In the cases of the duck-rabbit illusion and ambiguity, we have a Gestalt 
shift between the representations of two different objects. In the cases of the Necker cube and 
spinning dancer illusions and semantic-value-self-ascribing sentences, we have a Gestalt shift 
not between two objects, but between two different perspectives on the same object (granting 
some convenient metaphysical assumptions about the identity of cubes). The relevance of this 
distinction becomes clear in section 4.10. 
Overall, I do not suggest that the bistability of (L) per se explains its paradoxicality. It 
cannot. This is so because all sentences that predicatively self-ascribe a semantic value are 
bistable by saliency, and not all of them are paradoxical.10 Rather, I argue that the bistability 
of liar sentences is one of several factors that are jointly sufficient to explain (L)’s 
paradoxicality and that have to be taken into account in a theory of truth. 
 
4.4. Self-Reference and Context Sensitivity in Liar and Truth-Teller 
Sentences  
                                                          
9 Of course, one may propose that we solve the Liar by prohibiting such salience-based Gestalt shifts. However, 
first, it seems entirely ad hoc, if one restricts such prohibition to liar sentences. Second, either one has to grant 
pragmatics an unusual impact on inferences, or one has to hold that there is a difference in linguistic content 
between ascriptional and designational understanding. Neither seems a good idea. (Some more on this in section 
4.10.) 
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(This section is a compressed and criminally simplified presentation of a point I hope to set 
out in more detail in a separate paper.) A second feature that semantic-value-self-ascribing 
sentences share is what, following Herzberger 1970, Kripke has called their ungroundedness 
(Kripke 1975).  My preference is to think of this feature as a kind of context sensitivity. Take 
the sentence 
(2) The sentence ‘s’ is true. 
This sentence can only be semantically evaluated if either (i) things are as the sentence 
denoted by the subject expression of (2) (i.e., the sentence ‘s’) says they are, or (ii) things are 
not as the sentence ‘s’ says they are. In the first case (2) is true, in the second it is false. I call 
the contexts in which (2) can be semantically (82) evaluated circumstances. They are (i) the 
circumstances in which things are as the sentence designated by the subject expression of (2) 
says they are, and (ii) the circumstances in which things are not as the sentence designated by 
the subject expression of (2) says they are. The assumption is that a circumstance is of the 
second kind precisely if it is not of the first kind, tertium non datur. 
Accordingly, it is a necessary condition for the semantic evaluation of the semantic-
value-self-ascribing sentences (T) or (L) that either (i) things are as the sentence denoted by 
their subject expression, i.e., the sentence (T) or (L), says they are, or (ii) things are not as the 
sentence denoted by their subject expression, i.e., the sentence (T) or (L), says they are. The 
contexts in which (T) or (L) can be evaluated are (i) the circumstances in which things are as 
the sentence designated by the subject expression of (T) or (L) says they are, and (ii) the 
circumstances in which things are not as the sentence designated by the subject expression of 
(T) or (L) says they are. I understand the assignment of a circumstance of one of the two kinds 
to the subject expression of sentence like (L), (T), etc., as the mapping of the subject 
expression onto a circumstance of one of the two kinds. This is in line with standard accounts 
of context sensitivity. Of course, the circumstances in which things (i) are, or (ii) are not, as 
the sentence designated by the subject expression in (L) or (T) says they are, are precisely the 
circumstances in which things (i) are, or (ii) are not, as the sentence itself says they are. This is 
another manifestation of the self-reference in (L), (T), etc. Therefore, if you prefer to think of 
such assignments of circumstances as—possibly random—stipulations regarding the sentences 
(L), (T), etc., themselves, rather than regarding their subject expressions, this is fine, too. The 
difference is immaterial for the formal representation of truth in sections 4.7 and 4.8. Either 
way, the assignment satisfies a necessary condition for the semantic evaluability of (L) or (T) 
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and thus, if you like, ‘grounds’ them in some sense. In function (not in kind) you can compare 
these assignments of a circumstance to (L) or (T) with the initial assignments of a semantic 
value to (L) or (T) in revision theories of truth (Herzberger 1982a and 1982b; Belnap and 
Gupta 1993).
1012 Making semantic evaluability possible by fixing the context (or randomly 
stipulating how things are regarding (L) or (T)) is a required step that logically precedes the 
manifestation of assessment sensitivity in liar sentences to which I turn now.
1113  
 
4.5. Assessment Sensitivity 
Liar and truth-teller sentences share the two features of predicative truth-value ascription and 
self-reference, which combine into truth-value self-ascription. Truth-value self-ascription both 
makes them bistable and gives them their specific context sensitivity. The third feature of liar 
sentences, the one that sets them apart from truth tellers, and—in conjunction with the shared 
features—is responsible for their paradoxicality, is that they ascribe a semantic value that is at 
odds with truth. In this section I describe how the confluence of all three features endows liar 
sentences with a specific kind of unsavory assessment sensitivity. 
For this purpose, I introduce four very simple valid argument forms that produce 
conclusions (i) from the premise that things are as a sentence ‘p’ says they are and (ii) from 
the premise that things aren’t as the sentence ‘p’ says they are. There is a presupposition that 
the sentence ‘p’ says something. The name of the sentence ‘p’ is given in parentheses as (P): 
(P) p 
I express the relation between sentence and name as ‘(P) says that p’. The four 
argument forms are then as follows: 
Argument form 1 
1. Things are as (P) says. 
2. So (P) is true. 
Argument form 2 
1. Things are as (P) says. 
                                                          
10 
Needless to say, such circumstances are not what Kripke calls ‘specifiable circumstances’ for his meaning 
criterion (Kripke 1975, p. 699). 
11 This kind of context sensitivity of (L) and (T) is quite unlike those suggested by Parsons (1974) and 
Glanzberg (2004). 
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2. So p. 
Argument form 3 
1 Things aren’t as (P) says. 
2 So (P) is false. 
Argument form 4 
1 Things aren’t as (P) says. 
2 So it’s not the case that p. 
Argument forms 1 and 3 involve some kind of semantic ascent. Argument forms 2 and 4 
involve some kind of disquotation. (I use these argument forms, which I take to be generally 
accepted, in order to cast a shadow on the bivalence of the Liar sentence.) 
Applied to (L), the four argument forms help to bring out the paradoxicality of (L) in 
contrast with the nonparadoxicality of (T). I construct four hypothetical arguments that move 
from the assumption of a fixed context of the liar sentence (section 4.4) to a semantic-value 
ascription to the liar sentence. In the first two arguments, the context for (L) is the 
circumstance that things are as (L) says (context c1), in the last two, the circumstance that 
things aren’t as (L) says (context c2).
1214 
Argument 1 
1. Things are as (L) says.    context c1 
2. So (L) is true.    some kind of semantic ascent 
Argument 2 
1. Things are as (L) says. context c1 
2. So (L) is false. some kind of disquotation 
Argument 3 
1. Things aren’t as (L) says. context c2 
2. So (L) is false. some kind of semantic ascent 
Argument 4  (84) 
1. Things aren’t as (L) says. context c2 
2. So it’s not the case that (L) is false. some kind of disquotation 
3. So (L) is true. bivalence 
                                                          
12 Since what (L) says is precisely what the sentence denoted by the subject expression of (L) says, for 
convenience I use the shorter formulation. 
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All four arguments appear valid (argument 4 on the explicit assumption of bivalence). I 
call them legitimate, by which I intend that they are of a form to which there are no 
counterexamples. If we assume that its first line is true, each argument is also per se 
irrefutable, that is, it cannot be directly refuted. Yet, for either context, there are two 
arguments with incompatible conclusions. Which conclusion one obtains depends on which 
argument one chooses. (If one produces a corresponding set of hypothetical arguments for (T), 
with either context, the arguments conclude with the same semantic-value ascriptions in either 
argument. No incompatible conclusions arise.) 
Now, I call the fact that two different per se irrefutable arguments lead to conclusions 
that ascribe different semantic values to the same sentence ‘⌜S⌝’ argument-based assessment 
sensitivity of ‘⌜S⌝’. (L) is assessment sensitive in this sense. Moreover, if there are any two per 
se irrefutable arguments that ascribe in their conclusions two incompatible semantic values to 
the same sentence ‘⌜S⌝’, I assume that it is not true that ⌜S⌝, or (in predicate formulation) that 
‘⌜S⌝’ is not true tout court. I also assume that it is not false that ⌜S⌝, or that ‘⌜S⌝’ is not false 
tout court. The reason is that neither the truth nor the falsehood of a sentence should depend 
on what per se irrefutable argument we use to infer that sentence’s truth value. 
Let me present this argument-based assessment sensitivity of liar sentences somewhat 
more formally. Here is first, a general account of assessment sensitivity:
1315 
 
(3) An expression is assessment sensitive just in case its semantic value depends upon 
the viewpoint of assessment, i.e., the context from which it is assessed. 
 
The only linguistic expressions at issue at this point are sentences (with the context of 
evaluation fixed as c1 or c2). And the semantic values at issue are not the truth and falsehood 
tout court of these sentences, but are values that function as constitutive elements of these—
stand-alone—values. (This general idea should be familiar from supervaluationst theories.) 
                                                          
13 Cf. e.g. MacFarlane (2014). 
Susanne Bobzien  Gestalt Shifts in the Liar Or Why KT4M is the Logic of Semantic Modalities 
19 
 
Since these values are constitutive of truth and falsehood tout court, I call them semantic 
subvalues. We then obtain this modified account.
1416 
 
(4) A sentence (context fixed) is argument-based assessment sensitive just in case its 
semantic subvalue depends upon the argument at the viewpoint from which it is 
assessed. 
 
Let (85) me explain the three main terms of (4) in terms of argument forms 1 to 4: I say that 
each viewpoint regarding an atomic sentence S houses a legitimate argument with a conclusion 
that is a semantic-value-ascription to S.
1517 I call such atomic sentences S input sentences and 
such arguments viewpoint-arguments. These arguments are hypothetical deductions in a 
metalanguage.
1618  Each viewpoint-argument for S terminates as soon as it reaches a semantic-
value ascription to S. There are four relevant types of viewpoint arguments, and the argument 
forms 1 to 4 from above can serve to exemplify these, if we supplement them with additional 
uses of the principle of bivalence or semantic ascent where necessary. These arguments can be 
divided into two kinds, in line with section 4.2.3. First, there are semantic-ascent-first 
viewpoint-arguments. In these, a statement of the circumstances, (i) or (ii), is followed by the 
use of semantic ascent. For (L), arguments 1 and 3 are such viewpoint arguments. Second, 
there are disquotation-first viewpoint-arguments. In these, a statement of the circumstances, (i) 
or (ii), is followed by the use of disquotation, and then by the use of further rules or theorems, 
if necessary. For (L), arguments 2 and 4 would be disquotation-first viewpoint-arguments.  
Assessments and semantic sub-values. We can now give a more precise account of 
the assessments and semantic subvalues. An assessment is an assessment of an atomic 
sentence S at a viewpoint. It is based on the conclusion of a viewpoint-argument at that 
                                                          
14 
This assessment sensitivity is unsavoury, since whether something is true or false should not depend on which 
(compelling) argument one uses to obtain a truth-value ascription to it. I am not at all concerned with assessment 
sensitivity that is not of this kind and suspend judgment on theories that claim that assessment sensitivity is a 
semantic fact for epistemic modals, expressions of personal taste and the like. 
15
 In his defense of the assessment sensitivity of liar sentences, Alexandre Billon suggests that, in the case of 
sentence types, viewpoints correspond to arguments (Billon 2011). So, in my view, he gets it almost right. But 
why arguments? Well, empirical data, perception, and intuition seem not very promising starting points for liar 
and truth-teller sentences. 
16 The viewpoint arguments are not part of the natural language fragment TL .   
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viewpoint. Each such conclusion assigns a semantic value to S. These values are relative to the 
viewpoint. As such they cannot be the semantic values of truth or falsehood tout court. Rather, 
they are the semantic sub-values that are constitutive for those values. There are exactly two 
such values: TRUE (i.e. at a viewpoint) and FALSE (i.e. at a viewpoint). The assessments are 
thus bivalent. 
How viewpoints are related to viewpoints.  A viewpoint is defined not just by its 
viewpoint arguments, but also by what other viewpoints it has access to. (I only consider 
relations in which the context does not change from one viewpoint to the next.) First, 
naturally, any viewpoint is such that if someone has taken it, then they have access to it 
(reflexivity). Second, some viewpoints are such that someone who has taken them can, from 
them, take another viewpoint. And since once they have taken that other viewpoint they would 
be able to take whatever viewpoints that viewpoint can take (if any), such a person would also 
have access to those viewpoints (transitivity). There are also viewpoints such that someone 
who has taken them cannot take another viewpoint. Such viewpoints can be described as 
satisficer viewpoints. A satisficer is disposed to cease looking for alternatives once they have 
found what they were looking for—in our case a per se irrefutable argument with a conclusion 
that provides a semantic-value ascription to the input sentence. Nonsatisficers are disposed to 
continue looking for an alternative viewpoint. So, with regard to (L), from a non-satisficer 
viewpoint someone could have access to arguments 1 and 2, or to arguments 3 and 4, but from 
a satisficer viewpoint, they would only have access to one of these arguments each time. Both 
satisficer and nonsatisficer viewpoints are (86) entirely rational viewpoints to hold. We don’t 
usually require someone to produce more than one valid and per se irrefutable argument to 
prove a conclusion, but we also usually don’t object when someone produces more than one 
such argument. 
Using arguments 1 to 4 from above, one can see that, even with their context fixed, 
liar sentences are assessment sensitive, since their semantic subvalue depends upon the 
viewpoint from which they are assessed. Truth-teller sentences do not emerge as assessment 
sensitive, as one can see by using argument forms 1 to 4 for (T) rather than (L). If one widens 
the scope of assessments to other atomic sentences, including semantic-value-ascribing non-
self-referential sentences, other self-referential sentences, and those that are neither, none of 
these result in being assessment sensitive either. Liar sentences are special in this regard. 
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Based on the argument-based assessments at viewpoints, we can now define the 
semantic values of atomic sentences and their interrelations. If, with its context fixed, a 
sentence S has the same subvalue regardless of viewpoint, I say S has the value true-
regardless (or false-regardless), because its value is regardless of viewpoint. Otherwise, I say 
S has the value true-depending, since its value depends on the viewpoint taken. For obvious 
reasons, we have 
 
(5) Whenever a sentence ‘⌜S⌝’ is true-depending, its negation is also true-
depending.
1720 
 
We could also say that whatever is true-depending is false-depending as well. For different 
obvious reasons, we also have 
 
(6) Whenever a sentence ‘⌜S⌝’ is true-regardless, then ⌜S⌝.1821   
 
Since truth and falsehood (tout court) should not depend on what per se irrefutable argument 
we use to infer a sentence’s truth value, I identify truth-regardless with truth (tout court) and 
falsehood-regardless with falsehood (tout court) in a natural language like English. In line 
with section 4.1, I use the sentential operator ‘it is true that’ to express truth-regardless and use 
‘it is true that (it is) not (the case that)’ to express falsehood-regardless. (There are clear 
similarities to the notions of stable, or nearly stable, truth and falsehood and unstable values, 
in revision theories of truth such as Herzberger 1982a; and Belnap and Gupta 1993.) 
                                                          
17
 S is true-depending whenever it is neither true-regardless nor false-regardless. Its negation not-S is true-
depending whenever it is neither true-regardless nor false-regardless. Whenever there is a viewpoint from which 
S is false-regardless, S is not true-regardless and not-S is not false-regardless. Whenever there is a viewpoint from 
which S is true-regardless, S is not false-regardless and not-S is not true-regardless. So, whenever there are both a 
viewpoint from which S is true-regardless and a viewpoint from which S is false-regardless, there are also both a 
viewpoint from which not-S is true-regardless and a viewpoint from which not-S is false-regardless. 
18 To show (6), suppose: ‘⌜S⌝’ is true-regardless and it is not the case that ⌜S⌝. Then things are not as ‘⌜S⌝’ says. 
Then ‘‘⌜S⌝’ is false’ is the conclusion at a viewpoint (see above). Then ‘⌜S⌝’ has the subvalue FALSE at that 
viewpoint. Then ‘⌜S⌝’ is not true-regardless. 
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So, (L) is assessment sensitive and true-depending, regardless of context. (T) is 
assessment insensitive while being constantly true-regardless in one context and false-
regardless in the other. Gestalt shifts occur in disquotation-first arguments in both cases. (They 
are required for the recognition that after the use of disquotation, we have a truth-value 
ascription to the sentence – either when moving (87) from line 1 to line 2 or when 
contemplating line 2.) In truth-teller sentences the Gestalt shifts are benign. In liar sentences 
they are malignant. The paradoxicality of liar sentences results from the combination of a 
pragmatic element, i.e., their bistability, with the self-ascription of a semantic value that is 
incompatible with truth, a combination that leads to the (bivalence-undermining) assessment 
sensitivity of liar sentences. 
 
4.6. The Undecidable Semantic Status of Liar Sentences and Liar 
Agnosticism 
One would be misjudging the nature of the assessment sensitivity laid out in the previous 
section, if at this point one were to infer that it is my suggestion that liar sentences are neither 
true nor false, or are both true and false, or have no semantic value. Any such further step of 
introducing an absolute semantic status for liar sentences would be utterly misguided. Rather, 
my point is precisely that the relative, viewpoint-dependent, semantic subvalues of liar 
sentences are as far as one can get with regard to the semantic status of liar sentences. 
It is by recognizing and acknowledging this fact, that one finds the appropriate 
epistemic stance towards liar sentences. What is specific about the viewpoint-arguments is 
that each one of them is fully legitimate and per se irrefutable. The conclusion of each 
viewpoint-argument is as justified as any further conclusion to the effect that a sentence’s 
semantic value depends on one’s viewpoint. For illustration: the conclusion that (L) is true (by 
argument 1 or 4) is as legitimate as the conclusion that (L) is false (by argument 2 or 3) and is 
as legitimate as any further conclusion that at one viewpoint (L) is true, at another false, i.e., 
that (L) is true-depending. Each of these three conclusions results from flawless reasoning. (In 
the first two cases, if someone looks no further, we have a satisficer viewpoint, in the last case 
we have a nonsatisficer viewpoint.) We do not expect someone who produces the irrefutable 
argument that concludes that (L) is true to go looking for alternative arguments. Nobody can 
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be faulted for adhering to their conclusion.
1923 In other words, it is characteristic of the 
assessment sensitivity that institutes the semantic status of liar sentences that it itself is 
assessment sensitive. It is because of this, that the appropriate epistemic attitude toward any 
semantic status of liar sentences is suspension of judgement—with regard to their truth or 
falsehood as much as with regard to their assessment sensitivity. The appropriate reaction is 
liar agnosticism. 
Let me explain this a little more formally. For purposes of illustration, I fix (L)’s 
context as c1 ‘things are as (L) says’. With c1, for rational individuals, there could in principle 
be the following four viewpoints: the two satisficer viewpoints that, respectively, house 
argument 1 or argument 2 from the previous section, and that have no access to other 
viewpoints; and two nonsatisficer viewpoints. One of these would house argument 1 and have 
access to a viewpoint housing (88) argument 2. The other would house argument 2 and have 
access to a viewpoint housing argument 1.
2024 I call these four viewpoints viewpoints 1, 2, 3, 
and 4, in this order. Given c1, someone at one of the two nonsatisficer viewpoints can make 
the following further inference from their two viewpoint-arguments: 
 
It depends on one’s viewpoint whether (L) is true or false. 
 
Or, what is the same, 
 
(L) is true-dependent. 
 
So, with the context of evaluation ‘things are as (L) says’ selected, there are three conclusions 
provided by the four possible viewpoints. Each appears to have been reached by impeccable 
reasoning. Analogous results are obtained with the context c2, ‘things are not as (L) says’. For 
contrast, with (T) only different contexts of evaluation provide different truth values. 
                                                          
19 
Thus, among rational viewpoints to hold, there always exist satisficer viewpoints with the viewpoint-arguments 
1 and 2. 
20 This is only a partial description of rational viewpoints. There are two options for nonsatisficer viewpoints. 
The viewpoint they access may in turn be a satisficer viewpoint or a nonsatisficer viewpoint. So, in the first 
nonsatisficer case, the viewpoint housing argument 2 could be a satisficer or a nonsatisficer viewpoint, and in the 
second case, the viewpoint housing argument 1 could be. Since among the (rational) viewpoints there always is a 
satisficer viewpoint, each nonsatisficer viewpoint either directly or indirectly accesses a satisficer viewpoint. 
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The outcome concerning (L) points to a crucial feature of truth. The argument housed 
at the satisficer viewpoint 1 concludes that (L) is true. It results from an irrefutable argument. 
Nothing suggests the conclusion is come by dishonestly. We do not expect someone who 
produces this kind of argument to go look for further or alternative arguments. That is, from 
viewpoint 1, (L) is true-regardless. Mutatis mutandis the same holds for the satisficer 
viewpoint 2. From viewpoint 2 (L) is false-regardless. So, with the context fixed, both the 
value true-regardless and the value false-regardless of (L) can be rationally defended on their 
own. The third possible scenario is that someone takes a nonsatisficer viewpoint, i.e., a 
viewpoint that takes an alternative viewpoint, if there is one. Viewpoints 3 and 4 are examples. 
In such a scenario, effectively the overall result is that (L) is true-depending. Since there is 
nothing irrational about someone searching for more than one argument that produces a 
semantic value for (L), this result, too, can be rationally defended. There are then equally 
justifiable viewpoints that result in (L) being true-regardless, false-regardless, and true-
depending. Consequently, it depends on what viewpoint one takes, whether (L) is assessment 
sensitive. In other words, it is true-dependent whether (L) is true-dependent.
2125 
One can show that this result is true-dependent as well. All one needs to concede is 
that the holder of a rational viewpoint can access and assess (by further argument) their 
previously reached results regarding (L) and that truth-regardless and falsehood-regardless are 
luminous. Both are points that are generally granted. Then the following principle holds. 
 
(7) If some sentence is true-regardless or false-regardless, then a sentence expressing 
that this is so is true-regardless. (89) 
 
With (7), for viewpoint 1 we obtain the argument 
 
                                                          
21 Objection: But if one can take a viewpoint which accesses two arguments that come to conflicting 
conclusions, then surely each of these arguments alone is no longer defensible. Reply: This is not so. Given that 
the context is fixed, the arguments are each flawless. The facts that, looked at differently, a different conclusion 
results and that, looked at in two ways, two conflicting conclusions result do not change the fact that, as it is, the 
one argument is legitimate and irrefutable and nobody can be faulted for adhering to its conclusion, no matter 
what. Arguing otherwise is basically simply denying the paradoxicality of the Liar. At the minimum, a flaw in the 
argument would need to be identified. The fact that, looked at differently, a different conclusion results is not an 
indication that the argument is flawed. Instead, it may be an indication that something is not quite right with (L). 
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1. (L) is true-regardless. Viewpoint 1 
2. ‘(L) is true-regardless’ is true-regardless. (7) 
 
And for viewpoint 2 we obtain the argument 
 
1. (L) is false-regardless. Viewpoint 2 
2. ‘(L) is false-regardless’ is true-regardless. (7) 
   
These satisficer viewpoint-arguments, too, are flawless. Moreover, at each viewpoint such 
arguments using (5.1) can be repeated ad infinitum, each time applying (5.1) to the conclusion 
of the preceding argument. 
So, since there are (i) viewpoints that result in the truth-regardless of the truth-
regardless of (L) and (ii) viewpoints that result in the truth-regardless of the falsehood-
regardless of (L) being false-regardless, and (iii) viewpoints that result in the truth-depending 
of the truth-depending of (L) (see above), we can infer that it is true-depending that it is true-
depending that it is true-depending that (L). Analogous arguments of this type can be 
developed to obtain further iterations of ‘truth-depending’. It is thus a characteristic of truth-
regardless that 
 
(8) If a sentence is viewpoint-dependent regarding its semantic status, then it is 
viewpoint-dependent whether this is so (i.e. whether the sentence is viewpoint-
dependent regarding its semantic status), and viewpoint-dependent whether this in turn 
is so, and so on. 
 
This means that, if we take seriously the fact that the viewpoint-arguments housed in the 
various viewpoints are impeccable—and we have no reason not to, since they are per se 
irrefutable—the kind of agnosticism it is rational to hold about the Liar is the following. Not 
only do we need to suspend judgement w.r.t. whether liar sentences have truth or falsehood as 
their semantic value. We also need to suspend judgement w.r.t whether liar sentences are 
viewpoint-dependent, and w.r.t whether it is viewpoint-dependent whether liar sentences are 
viewpoint-dependent, and so on. Elsewhere, I call such agnosticism absolute agnosticism 
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(Bobzien 2010). I propose that the epistemic stance of absolute agnosticism is the correct one 
for the Liar.  
 
4.7. The Normal Modal System KT4M with the Truth Operator T for 
Truth-Regardless 
In the next two sections I provide a formalization of the truth-operator. In this section I 
provide a formal representation of the notion of truth (p.90) that complements liar 
agnosticism. In section 4.8, I add a matching model-theoretic semantics. In Section 4.9, and 
based on the formal representation and model-theoretic semantics, I introduce a procedure that 
makes it possible to show of non-paradoxical sentences that they are bivalent. The 
philosophical argument continues in section 4.10. 
 
Any formal representation of truth in natural languages needs to consider whether to represent 
something’s being true by means of a truth predicate or a truth-operator. I use a sentential 
operator ‘it is true that’, for reasons set out in section 4.1. In section 4.5, I identified truth with 
truth-regardless and falsehood with false-regardless as set out in terms of the sub-values TRUE 
and FALSE in that section. The value-ascribing predicates ‘is true-regardless’ and ‘is false-
regardless’ are related to the truth-operator as follows (where ‘⌜S⌝’ is the name of the sentence 
abbreviated as S): 
 
(9) A sentence ‘⌜S⌝’ is true-regardless iff it is true that S. 
(10) A sentence ‘⌜S⌝’ is false-regardless iff it is true that [it is] not [the case that] S. 
 
(‘It is false that S’ and ‘It is true that [it is] not [the case that] S’ are assumed to be equivalent.) 
In common understanding, a sentence is bivalent if it is either true or false. In terms of truth-
regardless, a sentence is defined as bivalent if it is either true-regardless or false-regardless, 
and that is, if it is not true-depending. 
 
(11) A sentence ‘'⌜S⌝’ is bivalent iff either it is true that S or it is true that [it is] not [the 
case that] S. 
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I symbolize the sentential operator ‘it is true that’ with an italicized bold capital T. 
Syntactically, T is modeled on the necessity operator □ in normal modal logics and can be 
iterated indefinitely. From classical logic I add p, p1, p2, . . .  for atomic sentences and the 
connectives ¬, ˄, ˅, → and ↔. I adopt the common method of describing modal systems with 
schemata of axioms and theorems and henceforth use ‘axiom’ as short for ‘axiom schema’ and 
‘theorem’ as short for ‘theorem schema’. A, A1, A2,. . . are metalinguistic expressions for 
arbitrary well-formed formulas. 
The results of sections 4.5 and 4.6 suggest that the operator T is governed by the 
principles and rules that govern the modal system KT4 (that is, the rules PC, that all 
tautologies of propositional calculus are axioms, MP (modus ponens) and N (Necessitation), 
and the axioms K, T, 4) plus one additional axiom. The rules MP, N, and the truth axioms KT 
([TA1˄[TA1→TA2]]→TA2), TT (TA→A) and 4T (TA→TTA) should be uncontroversial. Moves 
to drop any of them in order to solve the liar paradox are here disregarded, for obvious 
reasons. The same holds for dropping PC. Axiom 4T expresses the luminosity of ‘it is true 
that’ that was introduced informally as (7) in section 4.6. Axiom TT expresses (6) from section 
4.5. It is the modal correlate to semantic descent. 
For convenience, I define an operator that expresses truth-depending (‘it is not true that 
A and it is not false that A’) using the symbol Ŧ. 
defA A A.   T T T  
(Ŧ can be visualized as a combination of the letters T and F—a reminder that ŦA 
results from truth at one viewpoint and falsehood at another.) Ŧ parallels the downward-
pointing triangle ∇ (‘it is contingent that’) from contingency logic. The informal principle (5) 
from section 4.5 can then be formally expressed as the truth-correlate to the Mirror Theorem, 
i.e., as ŦA↔Ŧ¬A. The operator Ŧ also provides a succinct way of modally expressing 
bivalence. ¬ŦA expresses that either it is true that A or it is false that A. By (11), this provides 
the modal correlate to the bivalence of A. 
The additional axiom is designed to capture the informal principle (8) from section 4.6 
that motivates suspension of judgement on liar sentences. This principle generalizes to ‘when 
it is true-depending whether A, then it is true-depending whether it is true-depending whether 
A’, formally 
MŦ   ˫  ŦA ŦŦA 
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or, in terms of the T-operator, 
[TATA][T[TATA]T[TATA]]. 
System KT4T supplemented by axiom MŦ provides the formal equivalent to the representation 
of truth in natural language
2226as developed in sections 4.1 to 4.6. In system KT, and hence in 
KT4, the triangle equivalent to MŦ (i.e. A A  ) is equivalent to the McKinsey axiom 
M  ˫  □A□A. 
 
This can be easily demonstrated.
2327Accordingly, the proposed formal representation of truth 
in natural language is structurally equivalent to the normal modal system KT4M.
2428It has a 
truth operator that is governed by a normal modal logic and has a Kripke semantics, or 
possible-worlds semantics. It is thus coherent. Henceforth, ‘KT4M’ is understood as denoting 
system KT4M with the truth-operator T instead of the □-operator. There are clear parallels in 
the use of KT4 for a truth-operator (i) in predicative axiomatic theories of truth, where Kripke-
Feferman (Feferman 1984) is very close, with its axioms KF1-5 and KF8-10 (following 
Horsten 2011), and (ii) in revisionist theories of truth, where Herzberger’s schemata i to iv are 
similarly close (Herzberger 1982a, 495–96). Still, for obvious reasons, (92) neither Kripke-
Feferman nor Herzberger contains an unrestricted necessitation rule (more on which in section 
4.10, where I discuss the ‘liar property’) and neither contains axiom M or the relation of 
finality. With the falsehood of A formalized as T¬A, by means of axioms T and 4, KT4M also 
provides roughly functional analogues (in modal terms) to the Kripkean fixed points: 
TA↔TnA for any n, for truth and T¬A↔Tn¬A for any n, for falsehood. 
 
4.8. A Modal Semantics for KT4M and Its Representation of Truth (i.e. 
Truth-Regardless) 
In this section I provide a model-theoretic Kripke semantics for KT4M as the logic of truth in 
natural language, with an interpretation that reflects the context sensitivity of (L) and (T) and 
the assessment sensitivity of (L) as discussed informally in earlier sections. 
                                                          
22 Sections 4.12 to 4.14 specify further how truth in natural language is represented. 
23 E.g. Bobzien (2015), pp. 85–85. 
24 KT4M is also known as S4M and as S4.1. For some historical background see e.g. Hughes and Cresswell 
(1996). For its decidability see Segerberg (1968). 
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Here are the customary basics of the modal semantics KT4M. p, p1, p2, . . . are countably 
infinitely many atomic sentence formulas. A frame F is an ordered pair <W, R>, where W is a 
nonempty set of objects (‘points’) and R is a binary accessibility relation defined over the 
members of W, so that it is determinate for any points w, w′ in W whether wRw′. A model M 
is an ordered triple <W, R, V> where W is a nonempty set of objects (‘points’), R is a binary 
accessibility relation defined over the members of W, and V is a value assignment for the 
atomic sentence formulas of M, satisfying the standard value assignment rules (R1) to (R3): 
(R1) For any p and any w W , either V(p, w) = 1 or V(p, w) = 0. 
(R2) [V¬] For any wff, A, and any w W , V (¬A, w) = 1 if V(A, w) = 0; otherwise, V 
(¬A, w) = 0. 
(R3) [V˅] For any wff A and B, and for any w W , V((A˅B), w) = 1 if either V(A, 
w) = 1 or V(A, w) = 1; otherwise, V(A, w) = 0. 
Instead of the rule for the necessity operator □ there is an analogous one for the truth-operator 
T: 
(R4) [VT] For any wff A and for any w W , V(TA, w) = 1 if for every w' W  such 
that wRw′, V(A, w′) = 1; otherwise V(TA, w) = 0.2529 
Conditions for the sentential operators ˄, →, ↔, and Ŧ can be derived from the above in the 
usual way. In terms of frames, the system KT4M can be characterized by the class of frames 
that are transitive and reflexive and in which every world can access at least one world that 
can access only itself. This last condition is known as finality.
2630 
In line with sections 4.1 to 4.7, one can produce the following model-theoretic 
representation of truth-regardless based on the class of KT4M frames. Its purpose (93) is (i) to 
provide a formal correlate to the informally introduced—liar-accommodating—notion of 
truth-regardless, (ii) to show how the structural elements of truth-regardless can be encoded 
in such a model. and (iii) to prove the coherence of the notion of truth-regardless. The basic 
parameters of the representation are these: 
                                                          
25 For a rebuttal of the—misguided—objection that we do not need a possible-world semantics for truth, since 
there is a truth evaluation ‘built into’ possible worlds see Leitgeb (2003, p. 129). 
26 For soundness and completeness proofs for KT4M see, e.g., Hughes and Cresswell (1996). Finality has been 
shunned in theories of truth, though it is discussed in a paper whose authors, like myself, believe that truth and 
necessity should be approached in similar ways—if they do it the other way about than I (Halbach, Leitgeb, and 
Welch 2005). 
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– Atomic sentences of a natural language like English L (including atomic liar 
and truth-teller sentences). 
– Standard conditions of value assignments for complex sentences formed with 
the operators ¬, ˅, ˄, →, ↔. 
– Assessment viewpoints for the sentences. For each atomic sentence, such a 
viewpoint houses a per se irrefutable argument with a conclusion that is a 
semantic-value ascription to that sentence. Dispositionally, each viewpoint is 
either a satisficer viewpoint or a nonsatisficer viewpoint (section 4.5). 
– The semantic subvalues TRUE and FALSE. 
– Argument-based assessments that assign a semantic subvalue to each sentence 
at each viewpoint. 
– The subvalues for atomic sentences are obtained as set out in section 4.5. 
Subvalues for nonatomic sentences are obtained in accordance with Rules (R2) 
to (R4), where (R2) governs natural-language negation, (R3) natural-language 
binary inclusive disjunction, and (R4) natural-language sentential-operator use 
of ‘true’ and ‘false’ each understood as viewpoint-independent. 
– A reflexive, transitive, and final binary accessibility relation of being disposed 
to take a viewpoint from a viewpoint, based on section 4.5. (Being disposed to 
take a viewpoint is taken to entail being able to take that viewpoint.) 
– Truth-regardless, truth-depending, and bivalence as the resultant truth-
modalities of the sentences. 
– Circumstances. These ensure that the context of the liar and truth-teller 
sentences is fixed. 
The correlation between the model-theoretic framework and the parameters of its 
representation is the following. The atomic formulas p, p1, p2, . . .  encode logically 
independent atomic sentences of L. The values 1 and 0 encode the semantic subvalues TRUE 
and FALSE.
2732 Each point w encodes a possible assessment viewpoint for its set of atomic 
sentences p1 to pn. The set of points W corresponds to a nonempty set of possible viewpoints 
at which all sentences of a frame are assessed. V(p, w) = 1 encodes that, assessed at the 
                                                          
27
 For the relation between TRUTH and truth simpliciter see section 4.5. My subvalues TRUE and FALSE would 
correspond to Leitgeb’s internal truth, and the truth expressed by the truth-operator to his external truth (Leitgeb 
2003, p. 129), though otherwise what I offer is very dissimilar to his approach. 
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viewpoint w, p has the subvalue TRUE. V(p, w) = 0 encodes that, assessed at w, p has the 
subvalue FALSE. Thus ‘truth-at-a-point-w of A’ is a semantic value that is relative to the 
assessment of A at w, that is, TRUTH. The reflexive, transitive and final accessibility relation 
R encodes the disposition to take a viewpoint from a viewpoint. So wRw′ is interpreted as the 
relation of one being disposed to take the viewpoint w′ from one’s viewpoint w. Reflexivity, 
transitivity, and finality of (94) the relation are fleshed out thus. Reflexivity: Each viewpoint 
can be taken from itself. Someone who has a viewpoint is understood to be disposed to take it. 
Transitivity: Being disposed to take a viewpoint is the same as being disposed to get to have 
that viewpoint. Accordingly, one can take every viewpoint that viewpoint can take. Finality: 
Every viewpoint is disposed to take a viewpoint that is only disposed to take itself. That is, by 
‘collecting’ viewpoints via the relation R, from every viewpoint one may start out from, one 
gets to a viewpoint that opens up no further viewpoints. Such a viewpoint is a final viewpoint. 
Someone at that viewpoint lacks the disposition to take any other viewpoint. Given reflexivity, 
final viewpoints are satisficer viewpoints and vice versa. Given reflexivity, transitivity, and 
finality, every nonsatisficer viewpoint is disposed to take a satisficer viewpoint. A frame F 
encodes pathways of collecting viewpoints with regard to its atomic sentences p1 to pn. A 
model M encodes a possible subvalue assignment over F to the atomic sentences p1 to pn of 
the viewpoints of F. The valuated set of points W in a model M encodes a nonempty set of 
viewpoints that each comprises an assessment, i.e., subvaluations for each of its atomic 
sentences. 
Finally, circumstances. In order for liar and truth-teller sentences to be semantically 
evaluable, their context needs to be fixed (section 4.4). This requirement is satisfied in the 
representation of truth in KT4M via circumstances. Note that the conditions for fixing the 
context of the subject expressions of liar and truth-teller sentences from section 4.5 are 
identical with the following conditions: (i) Things are as (L) ((T), etc.) says. (ii) Things aren’t 
as (L) ((T), etc.) says. I call such conditions circumstance-conjuncts of a sentence. As it 
happens, every atomic sentence of TL —whether context sensitive in the manner of (L) and (T) 
or not—has two such circumstance-conjuncts. The semantic evaluability of liar and truth-teller 
sentences is then ensured in KT4MT, if in every model over every frame each atomic sentence 
is mapped onto precisely one of its two circumstance-conjuncts, for example p1 on (i), p2 on 
(ii), p3 on (ii), etc. I call the conjunction of those circumstance-conjuncts of a model M the 
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circumstance of M. In all nontrivial cases there will be a plurality of models with the same 
circumstance.
2833 
Validity and consistency of sentences in KT4MT are defined in the standard way. A 
sentence A is valid in KT4MT precisely if it is valid on all frames of KT4MT. A sentence A is 
consistent in KT4MT precisely if there is a viewpoint w in a model M of a frame F of KT4MT 
such that A is TRUE at w.  
This concludes the basic representation of truth-regardless and truth-depending by 
means of KT4M. Since KT4M is a normal modal logic, the notion of truth as truth-regardless 
developed in sections 4.1 to 4.6 and represented as semantic necessity, symbolized by T, is 
coherent within a classical, bivalent logic. 
 
4.9. Adding to KT4M the Distinction between Assessment-Sensitivity and 
Assessment-Insensitivity 
For KT4M to do more than define the structure of truth, we need to single out 
individual atomic sentences as assessment-insensitive.   
In the semantics, this requires a partial interpretation of KT4M coupled with a 
constraint on the class of models. This constrained KT4M or C-KT4M will also further 
elucidate how my usage of Kripke semantics differs from uses as possible-world semantics 
that take points to be worlds. The relevant partial interpretation incorporates into KT4M the 
distinction between assessment-sensitive and assessment-insensitive sentences from Section 4. 
Each atomic sentence p1, p2, … in each model is interpreted either as being assessment-
sensitive or as being assessment-insensitive. The class of models is then restricted to a 
subclass of models in which the same atomic sentences are marked out as assessment-
insensitive and in which not all atomic sentences are marked out as assessment-insensitive. I 
shall refer to this partially interpreted and constrained system as C-KT4M. With the 
philosophical results from Sections 2 to 5, a sentence p is semantically non-paradoxical 
precisely if it is assessment-insensitive, and a sentence p is semantically paradoxical precisely 
if it is assessment-sensitive. I take the two cases in turn. 
                                                          
28 Circumstances can perhaps be elucidated by comparison with possible-world semantics that have designated 
actual worlds. Circumstances are somewhat similar to whatever it is regarding a model that makes the actual 
world the actual world in that model (perhaps truth conditions of the actual world of M in such a semantics). Yet, 
in the representation of truth by KT4M, there are no designated actual worlds. 
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 (i) Atomic assessment-insensitive sentences. With its context fixed, any assessment-
insensitive sentence p has by definition the same conclusion in its arguments at all viewpoints. 
This conclusion is either that p is false or that p is true. In terms of the semantics of KT4M, 
each interpreted atomic sentence p has as its circumstance-conjunct either that things are as p 
says or that things aren’t as p says. This restricts the viewpoint-arguments for assessment-
insensitive p at each viewpoint to those that have the corresponding sentence (‘things are as p 
says’, ‘things aren’t as p says’) as a premise. (Or in any event I restrict the arguments thus, 
since otherwise there would be an inconsistency between the circumstance-conjunct and the 
first lines  of the arguments.) When  p’s circumstance-conjunct in a model M is that things are 
as p says, then no per se irrefutable argument is possible with the premise ‘things aren’t as p 
says’. When p’s circumstance-conjunct in the model M is that things aren’t as p says, then no 
per se irrefutable argument is possible with the premise ‘things are as p says’. All viewpoint-
arguments for p in M have one or the other as premise. As a result, in any model M the 
semantic subvalue ascribed to an assessment-insensitive p will be constant across viewpoints: 
constantly TRUE or constantly FALSE. 
One can then show as follows that in C-KT4M all semantically nonparadoxical 
sentences are bivalent, or, what is the same, that Tp˅T¬p holds of every nonparadoxical 
sentence. In the semantics of C-KT4M, in any model M over any frame F, (96) assessment-
insensitive sentences have constant subvalues across all viewpoints of M. The value of p 
across all viewpoints of M is either true or false. Thus, if p is nonparadoxical, Tp˅T¬p is 
on-valid F for any F of the class of frames of C-KT4M. Hence, by the definition of validity, for 
any nonparadoxical atomic p, Tp˅T¬p is valid tout court in C-KT4M. Thus, in modal terms, 
in C-KT4M all semantically nonparadoxical atomic sentences are bivalent.  
(ii) Atomic assessment-sensitive sentences. assessment-sensitive sentences are true-
depending. With its context fixed, any assessment-sensitive atomic sentence p has, by 
definition, a viewpoint at which its argument concludes that p is true and another viewpoint at 
which its argument concludes that p is false. In terms of the semantics of C-KT4M, again, in 
any model M, each interpreted atomic sentence p has as its circumstance-conjunct either that 
things are as p says or that things aren’t as p says. But this time there will be at least one 
model M with one viewpoint at which p is true and another viewpoint at which p is false. By 
(6), the same holds for the negations of assessment-sensitive atomic sentences. If we apply C-
KT4M to such assessment-sensitive sentences, we immediately obtain the following results. 
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No atomic assessment-sensitive sentence p or its negation is valid in C-KT4M  and of no 
assessment sensitive sentence p is any T
mŦnp or any TmŦn¬p (with m≥0 and n≥1) valid in C-
KT4M. 
Now, if a sentence is not valid in a logical system, then the system itself does not 
provide sufficient reasons for holding that sentence.
2934
 Thus C-KT4M  does not provide 
sufficient reason for holding any sentence that is assessment sensitive; nor for the holding of 
any sentence, including assessment sensitive ones, that it is true-depending; nor for the 
holding of any sentence, including assessment-sensitive ones, that it is truly true-depending, 
truly truly true-depending, etc. Since liar sentences and their kin are the only candidates for 
assessment sensitivity, C-KT4M accurately delivers the result that absolute agnosticism 
regarding the semantic status of liar sentences, as presented in section 4.7, is the appropriate 
epistemic stance to adopt about the liar paradox. For liar sentences, bivalence can neither be 
validated nor invalidated. 
 
4.10. The Liar Property, Gestalt Shifts, KT4M, and the Solution  
From the definitions of ‘true-depending’ and ‘consistency’ it follows that if a sentence is true-
depending (Ŧ) in KT4M, it is consistent in KT4M. So, insofar as liar sentences are true-
depending, in KT4M they are consistent. ‘But what about the liar property?’ some are bound 
to ask at this point.  What (97) about the liar property? By this I mean the property commonly 
expressed, with predicative semantic-value ascription, in a biconditional, sometimes relative to 
a language L, as a semantic relation as follows: 
 
(12)  (L)  ‘(L)’ is false. 35 
 
 (For the version with ‘untrue’ for ‘false’ see section 4.11.) The modal syntax of KT4M would 
allow us to express the liar sentence (L) both as L and as T¬L. (I do not consider the round 
brackets in (L) as part of the name of the liar sentence and omit them in modal formalizations, 
to prevent readers from inadvertently parsing the formulas as predicate formulas.) Also, 
                                                          
29 Plainly, I am not talking probabilistic logic here. 
30 I disregard the relation between the liar property and diagonalization. How the Diagonal Lemma and 
Incompleteness Theorem(s) are related to KT4M is the topic of a separate paper. For present purposes, it suffices 
to take ‘(L)’ to be the name of (L). See also footnotes 2 and 37. 
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trivially, biconditionals can be expressed in KT4M. So in principle the modal correlate to the 
liar biconditional (12) could be expressed relative to TL  (with TL  being the semantically closed 
propositional fragment of a natural language L like English with atomic liar and truth-teller 
sentences) as 
 
(LP)   L TL 
 
So much for syntax. What about the property itself that is usually meant to be 
expressed by the biconditional (12)? The short answer is that the liar property is already 
accounted for in KT4M. More specifically, it is accounted for by the combination of theorem 
MŦ with the interpretation of the operator Ŧ as true-depending and a possible-worlds semantics 
that incorporates both context sensitivity and assessment sensitivity of semantic-value-self-
ascribing sentences. Thus there is no need for adding to the logic of truth KT4M a 
biconditional like (LP) to account for the liar property sentence. In fact, it would be misguided, 
if one were to add such a biconditional. I explain why this is so. 
First, I do not deny that there is a liar property of a kind such that it might be tempting 
to express it in ordinary language versions of (12). Rather, I maintain that this property is a 
pragmatic feature of the liar sentence. Now, pragmatic features of sentences are not usually 
features a logic is meant to represent. Accordingly, KT4M does not represent it. There is 
neither a logical nor a semantic relation that sanctions the moves from L to T¬L and from 
T¬L to L.37 What is the pragmatic feature that is the liar property? It is the bistability of (L). It 
is the fact that an individual who entertains (L) can experience a shift from understanding it in 
one way to understanding it in another way (where ‘understanding’ is used to indicate a 
pragmatic feature as introduced in section 4.3). This shift is a Gestalt shift from the 
designational understanding to the ascriptional understanding, or vice versa (section 2.3). 
How is this feature related to (12) or to (LP)? First, it might seem natural to express 
(L), when understood ascriptionally by ‘T¬L’, and when understood designationally as ‘L’. 
‘T¬L’ and the atomic ‘L’ would then indicate different ways of (98) understanding the same 
                                                          
31
 KT4M does cover certain logical relations between L and T, namely those expressible in propositional modal 
logic. These include TL→L, T¬L→¬L, and L→¬T¬L, via axiom T and, if L has been proved, the move from L 
to TL via N. Because of ŦL (which itself can neither be proved nor disproved), this move can never happen, 
though. 
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sentence, or would express the same sentence from different viewpoints. The sentence 
expressed by either formula would be the liar sentence. Just as the two views of the spinning 
dancer could be taken to represent the same object, i.e., the same dancer, but from different 
viewpoints, so ‘T¬L’ and ‘L’ could be used to express the same sentence, but to express it 
differently. Assuming a fixed context (circumstance), both the meaning and the extension of 
the two expressions ‘T¬L’ and ‘L’ would then be the same.  
However, this is not what I suggest. It is true that just as one could say that the left-
spinning dancer is the right-spinning dancer, one could say that TL is L. But just as the 
expression ‘left-spinning dancer’ is not the same expression as ‘right-spinning dancer’, so  
‘TL’ is not the same expression as ‘L’. They are different sentences.  So, in the logic KT4M, 
they denote different objects. Accordingly, the liar property is taken to allow a prima facie 
pragmatically licit transition from one sentence to the other.  
Just as there are things we can infer from the left-spinning dancer and from the right-
spinning dancer that are incompatible (you cannot spin left and right at the same time), so 
there are things we can infer from the-Liar-qua-understood-one-way that are incompatible 
with the- Liar-qua-understood-the-other-way, for example we can infer T¬L from T¬L but 
not from L, and can infer L from L but not from T¬L. Thus pragmatic factors are the reason 
why incompatible things can be derived from ‘TL’ and from ‘L’. 
Now, of course, you are welcome (i) to add pragmatic information to a logical system, 
and then (ii) to supplement the rules of that system with whatever pragmatic restrictions are 
consequently required to keep it consistent. What matters, if you do so, is that you are aware 
of what you are actually doing. For illustration, I return to the ambiguous sentence (TEL) ‘I 
saw the woman with the telescope’ from section 4.3. Imagine that, in a system of first-order 
logic, first you add this ambiguous sentence to your stack of sentences and then you 
supplement your logic with a restrictive rule, to prevent any inconsistencies from being 
derivable as a result of your adding this sentence. 
Let us add more detail. Take (TEL) and first-order logic (FOL). Start with adding the 
sentences (TEL-I) for the reading (i) of the sentence (the speaker had the telescope) (TEL-her) 
for the reading (ii) (the woman had the telescope). Introduce the occurrence of a Gestalt shift 
from one reading to the other during an inference as (TEL-I)→(TEL-her) and (TEL-
her)→(TEL-I) respectively. Remember that the Gestalt shifts are not in the sentences but in 
the readers. So, it is at this point that you introduce a pragmatic element into your logic. Next 
Susanne Bobzien  Gestalt Shifts in the Liar Or Why KT4M is the Logic of Semantic Modalities 
37 
 
add a biconditional combining the two possible shifts between readings of the sentence and 
call this biconditional the Telescope property (TELP) 
 
(TELP)  FOL(TEL)   ˫     (TEL-I)(TEL-her)  
 
This (99) will allow you to derive inconsistencies in your language. Next, add a restrictive rule 
to the logic to prevent any inconsistencies. For instance, you could add the rule (RTel) that 
whenever a Gestalt shift occurs, nothing derived before the Gestalt shift using reading (i) can 
be employed to derive anything once you have shifted to reading (ii), and vice versa. Use the 
following telescope argument as example. (Context: you and the woman are 11 meters apart.) 
 
1. (TEL-I) assumption 1 
2. I use the telescope 1 
3. (TEL-I)→(TEL-her) Gestalt shift (dis-
charge assumption 1) 
4. (TEL-her) 1, 3, modus ponens 
5. She uses the telescope 4 
6. Two people more than 10 meters apart 
cannot use the same telescope at the same 
time 
Telescope Theorem 
7. ¬[I use the telescope] 4, 6 
8. I use the telescope ˄¬[I use the telescope] 2, 7, ˄-introduction 
 
Given rule (RTel), you cannot use 2 in step 7 to 8, since it was derived before the 
Gestalt shift. You could also have a fancier rule, say rule (RTel′), that allows you, after a 
second Gestalt shift, to access what you had derived before the first Gestalt shift, and after a 
third Gestalt shift, to access what you had derived after the first and before the second Gestalt 
shift, and so forth. The general method used should be clear. However, by most logicians, 
what you are doing would be regarded as pretty idiotic. Mostly, logicians prefer the method of 
disambiguating a sentence before they add it to their logic, and then adding both resulting 
sentences, and hey pronto. 
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Back to the liar property (LP). What I suggest is that adding the liar property as (LP) to 
KT4M is methodologically similar—and similarly misguided—to adding the ambiguous 
sentence (TEL) to first-order logic. The main difference from the telescope example is that 
where (TEL) is ambiguous and allows two readings, (L) is bistable for reasons of salience and 
allows two understandings. I go through the same steps. The biconditional (LP) would express 
a pragmatic feature. Each of its conditionals (LP→) and (LP←) is used to indicate the locus of 
a Gestalt shift, one for each direction. 
If you add this pragmatic relation to your logic, you will be able to derive 
inconsistencies. Let me illustrate this also. As example, I use the following modal 
representation of a simple Liar argument. Applications of the conditionals (LP→) and (LP←) 
of the liar property (line 8) are interpreted as representations of Gestalt shifts. (100) 
 
1. L→T¬L (LP→) (stated) 
2.            T¬L →¬L axiom T 
3. ¬L→¬TL axiom T, contraposition 
4. L→¬TL 1, 2, 3, PC 
5. TL→L axiom T 
6. TL→¬L 4, contraposition, double negation (PC) 
7. ¬TL 5, 6, PC 
8. L 7, (LP←) (used) 
9. TL 8, Necessitation 
10. TL˄¬TL 7, 9, ˄-introduction 
 
Next you add a suitable rule of restriction that reins in the pragmatic element you 
added, e.g., rule (RLiar) that whenever a Gestalt shift occurs, nothing derived before the 
Gestalt shift using the designational understanding can be employed to derive anything once 
you have shifted to the ascriptional understanding, and vice versa. Alternatively, you can add a 
fancier rule (RLiar′) modelled on (RTel′). Both (RLiar) and (RLiar′) are rules that require you 
to revise your set of assumptions and/or derived formulas each time a Gestalt shift occurs, 
restricting you to those that you obtained with the present Gestalt (or at your present 
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viewpoint). They are rules of the kind revision theories of truth might employ. With such a 
revision-theoretical restriction in place, line 4 can no longer be used to derive 7.
3238 
Now for the punch line. With the logic KT4M, the introduction of the pragmatically 
interpreted liar property (LP) followed by pragmatics-based restrictions on the logic is as 
misguided—if not more so—as the introduction of the telescope-property followed by the rule 
(RTel) into FOL. To extend the analogy, it is like introducing the telescope-property (TP) 
together with rule (RTel) into a logic that already contains the disambiguated sentences. 
On the assumption that the two conditionals of the liar property biconditional chronicle 
the occurrence of Gestalt shifts, and thus express a pragmatic relation that involves a 
speaker/listener, an appropriate logic for truth would be one in which (a) the inconsistency-
introducing pragmatic elements have been eliminated and (b) any relevant informational 
content of the liar sentence is retained—just as in FOL (a) the ambiguities of sentences are 
eliminated by disambiguation and (b) the disambiguated sentences have been added. 
Now, if we feed the effects of bistability on the liar sentence as viewpoint sensitivity 
into the possible-worlds semantics, KT4M does exactly that. In particular, it is axiom M that, 
added to KT4, preempts the need for revision-theoretical rules (or for an N-restriction rule), in 
the way in which disambiguation preempts the need for a rule like (RTel). 
As regards (a), we have seen above that there is no inconsistency in KT4M, and in 
particular truth is not an inconsistent notion. As regards (b): what is the (101) relevant 
informational content of the liar sentence that needs to be retained? It is that which belongs to 
it irrespective of which understanding (designational or ascriptional) someone is entertaining. 
This would presumably include the fact that it is bistable. If we consider the two expressions L 
                                                          
32 As an alternative to revision-theoretical rules, if you prefer to incorporate the pragmatically motivated 
restriction directly into the axiomatic system, you can place a restriction on a rule of KT4M (LP) . A suitable 
restriction would be the metarule that you cannot apply the rule of necessitation N to anything you derive after 
(LP) has introduced a Gestalt shift. In KT4MT, N bestows truth-regardless on any formula that has been derived 
in the system. For the above reasons, once we have a Gestalt shift, such a move to truth-regardless is no longer 
justifiable. Thus Gestalt shifts are accommodated by putting a restriction on a rule of KT4M for the system 
KT4M (LP) . In the above argument, this restriction on N bans the step from 5 to 6. As a result of 
supplementing KT4M with (LP) and an (LP)-based restriction on N, you obtain a logic that is extremely close 
both to the Kripke-Feferman system (KF) and to the formal theory Herzberger outlines as emerging from his 
Naive Semantics (Feferman 1984, 1991; Herzberger 1982a, p. 493). One crucial difference in the suggested 
theory is axiom M. 
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and T¬L as expressions that capture the difference in pragmatic aspect (in what is salient), 
then we can add the following from a logical perspective: we would expect that if you add L 
and TL as hypotheses in derivations in the constrained  C-KT4M, then L and T¬L have 
exactly the same inferential power. That is, that you can derive no more or less from one than 
from the other. And this is indeed the case. In KT4M, from L as well as from T¬L you can 
derive exactly the same things, which is precisely nothing that you could not derive with any 
other sentence of TL  in place of L or of T¬L. This can be easily shown.
3339 Thus C-KT4M 
both removes the inconsistencies and retains the relevant information about the liar sentence. 
One main purpose of sections 4.1 to 4.7 was to bring this out. 
It is not the liar sentence (L), but those two ways of understanding it, and that is a 
pragmatic fact, that license the derivation of incompatible conclusions in the hypothetical 
deductions or arguments 1 to 4. This fact is what makes the liar sentence paradoxical. In (12) 
from section 4.10 and in (LP) (when read as expressing a nonpragmatic property) we have a 
confusion of a pragmatic relation with a logical or semantic relation. So, truth is not an 
inconsistent notion (see above). Semantic paradoxes like the liar sentence make it appear 
inconsistent. They make it appear inconsistent, because a pragmatic feature (the bistability of 
liar sentences) is wrongly taken to be a nonpragmatic relation that can be accurately expressed 
in a material biconditional. (L) is disqualified as a semantically evaluable sentence, just as an 
ambiguous sentence is disqualified as an atomic sentence of classical logic. 
 
4.11. The Strengthened Liar and Revenge 
It is not uncommon for discussions of the Liar, or theories of truth, to ditch the simple Liar (L) 
and other semantic-value-self-ascribing sentences that self-ascribe falsehood for a sentence 
like 
 
(13) This sentence is untrue. 
                                                          
33 Thus you can derive e.g. LL, TLTL. By contrast, from the hypothesis L alone you can derive 
nothing, given ŦL (or ŦLR) and axiom M. On T¬L you can apply any axioms or rules of C-KT4M. Since we 
cannot prove the semantic value of T¬L, due to ŦL, MIRROR, and axiom M, we can detach no consequent of any 
conditional in which T¬L is the antecedent (or from a set of sentences Δ that includes it) and for the same reason 
we cannot apply N. On the other hand, from the hypothesis of an assessment-insensitive p you can derive p (Tp, 
p), and from the hypothesis of Tp you can derive p. 
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One rationale behind this is the following. Often, the paradoxicality of the simple Liar 
(L) is removed by the introduction of a third semantic status, only to return with a vengeance, 
armored in the garb of the strengthened liar. (13) preempts the revenge in such simple(ton) 
solutions. So, why not start where the real problem lies? The reason my approach starts with 
the simple Liar is that this made it easier to bring out what I suggest is the structure of the 
notion of truth. 
Even so, (102) since, in some sense, the proposed theory offers the possibility of three 
semantic statuses for sentences, I should say something about the strengthened liar. The 
traditional way of introducing revenge would be by means of a sentence that is a disjunction of 
the two values that are not the designated value of truth.
3440 So let us do that for the 
representation of truth as truth-regardless: 
 
(LR')  TLR'ŦLR'  
 
In KT4M, (LR') is logically equivalent to
3541 
 
(LR)  TLR   
 
In natural language, (LR) can be expressed as ‘This sentence is not true-regardless’. (LR) is the 
expected candidate for the modal version of the strengthened-liar sentence. It is easy to check 
that, like the simple Liar, it is bistable, context sensitive, and assessment sensitive. Like ‘L’ 
and ‘¬TL’, ‘LR’ and ‘¬TLR’ could be taken to indicate the Gestalt in which the sentence is 
understood. There is then also a strengthened-liar property, that LR is ¬TLR. Like the simple 
liar property, this strengthened-liar property is taken to be not a semantic but a pragmatic 
feature which allows a prima facie pragmatically licit transition from one sentence to the 
other. 
                                                          
34 Revenge arguments tend to be tailor-made to each liar solution. (See, e.g., Beall 2007 for a whole spectrum of 
vengeance.) Here I only show that the present theory accommodates the standard way of introducing revenge. 
35 The proof is trivial and is left to the reader. (Hint: use De Morgan, contraposition, ˄-elimination, def. ↔, def. 
Ŧ.) 
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Again, parallel to the case of the simple Liar, nothing prevents you from syntactically 
expressing this pragmatic strengthened-liar property as a biconditional in a language L: 
 
(LRP)    LR  TLR 
 
with the two conditionals of (LRP), denoted as (LRP→) and (LRP←), taken to indicate Gestalt 
shifts. Adding the pragmatic property (LRP) as a theorem to KT4M, you can then express a 
revenge paradox, for example  
 
1. ¬TLRLR (LRP←) (stated) 
2. TLR→LR axiom T 
3. LR 2, PC 
4. ¬TLR 3, (LRP→) (used) 
5. TLR 3, Necessitation 
6. TLR˄¬TLR 4, 5, ˄-introduction 
 
In order to remove the resulting inconsistencies, you can further supplement the system 
RKT4M (L P)  with a revision-theoretical rule (RstrLiar), adjusting the rule (RLiar) or the 
rule (RLiar′) in a suitable way. 
Again, (103) the addition of (LRP) and a revision-theoretical rule to KT4M would be 
sorely misguided. This is so, since the pragmatic liar property (LRP), too, is already accounted 
for in KT4M via the viewpoint-interpretation of the possible-worlds semantics. (13) is context 
sensitive and viewpoint sensitive, just like the simple Liar. Those two features are represented 
in a consistent way in KT4MT.
3642 The only logical differences between (L) and (13) are those 
that hold between the schemata T¬A and ¬TA in KT4M. The strengthened-liar sentence (LR) 
introduces no further possible semantic statuses beyond true-regardless, false-regardless and 
true-depending. Accordingly there is no iteration or proliferation of revenge sentences. 
 
                                                          
36 Arguments analogous to Arguments 1 to 4 can be constructed, with the context fixed, in the KT4MT 
semantics, by means of a circumstance-conjunct. With either circumstance-conjunct, there are viewpoints at 
which it can be inferred that (LR) is not true, and others at which it can be inferred that (LR) is not false. 
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To sum up sections 4.10 and 4.11: The present theory acknowledges that there is a 
pragmatic liar property of self-reference, in the sense that—with the context fixed—the 
sentence which ascribes falsehood (untruth) to itself is the sentence which is denoted by the 
subject expression of the sentence which ascribes falsehood (untruth) to itself—just from a 
different viewpoint. Liar sentences, whether simple or strengthened, do only apparently lead to 
contradiction, via a confusion of a pragmatic characteristic with a nonpragmatic one. The 
pragmatic feature disqualifies the sentences from being semantically evaluable.  
 
The reasoning in this and the previous section can with some modification be applied 
to the standard argument for an inconsistency in the truth predicate Tr that purports to 
produce, via Diagonal Lemma and Incompleteness Theorem, and relative to some language L, 
the contradiction   
           
(14)  Tr(⌜    r⌝)  Tr(⌜     ⌝). 
But here is not the place to do this.
3743 Equally, truth represented by KT4MT can accommodate 
multiple-sentence liar paradoxes, propositional versions of Kripke’s Nixon/Dean example, 
Curry Sentences, and open sentences such as the No-no-Paradox. Again, for reasons of space, 
these cases cannot be discussed. The procedure is always based on bistability and is similar to 
those for (T), (L), and (LR), or combinations of these. 
 
                                                          
37 As is obvious from this chapter, I do not believe that the so-called naïve theory of truth is our theory of truth. 
So, with regard to diagonalization, it would seem entirely reasonable to remove Liar sentences from the relevant 
language (e.g., PA with truth predicate) for the reasons (i) that it cannot be established that such sentences are 
semantically evaluable and (ii) that Tarski biconditionals do not extend to Liar sentences (see section 14). 
However, it seems more satisfying to show that liar paradoxes that are based on the diagonal lemma to prove the 
inconsistency of some λ, too, make use of the bistability of λ, and that λ is no less assessment-sensitive than our 
(L) and (LR). This is possible. The argument leaves the strengthened and extended diagonal lemma intact. The 
problem rather lies in the way the Tarski biconditional for the liar sentence is employed in the paradox. To those 
who at this point bring up Montague’s Theorem and the paradox of the knower, I point out that they are changing 
the subject. The predicate introduced by diagonalization in the proof of Montague’s Theorem is different from 
the truth predicate in the sense that we expect fewer sentences to be derivable. Perhaps what is knowable or 
informally provable is true, but the reverse does not hold. Whereas a modal logic for truth should be normal and 
complete, the same is not obvious for a knowability or informal-provability operator. (See also footnote 2.)  
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4.12. KT4MT as the Logic of Semantic Modalities: Bivalence and LEM 
Come Apart 
The reflections on the Gestalt shifts, context sensitivity, and assessment sensitivity of the Liar 
do not just provide a solution to the liar paradox. They also provide new insight into the notion 
of truth in natural language. Sections 4.12 to 4.14 examine more closely how KT4M is related 
to truth.  
By (104) analogy with the logics of logical modalities and metaphysical modalities, 
KT4M can be called the logic of semantic modalities (cf. section 4.13 below). This makes 
truth semantic necessity and bivalence semantic noncontingency. Just as a logic of 
metaphysical modalities does not produce individual metaphysical necessities as theorems, so 
a logic of semantic modalities does not produce individual truths as theorems. Rather, it 
defines the logical structure of truth and bivalence. 
Nonetheless, the logic of semantic modalities KT4M can be employed to gain further 
insight about semantic paradoxes, and truth, when we make the distinction between 
assessment-sensitive and assessment insensitive sentences explicit.   
Bivalence and excluded middle. In Section 4.9 we saw that C-KT4M validates that 
all semantically non-paradoxical atomic sentences are bivalent  (Result 1), that no atomic 
assessment-sensitive sentence p or its negation is valid in C-KT4M (Result 2), that of no 
assessment-sensitive sentence p is any T
mŦnp or any TmŦnp (with m≥0 and n≥1) valid in C-
KT4M (Result 3), and moreover that for Liar sentences, bivalence can neither be validated 
nor invalidated (Result 4). Hence, given the assumption of classical logic, the principle of 
bivalence and the law of excluded middle A˅¬A (LEM) come apart (Result 5). For any 
sentence A, liar sentences included, A˅¬A is valid in KT4M. On the other hand, for liar 
sentences the modally expressed principle of bivalence, TA˅T¬A, is not valid in KT4M.3845 
(A similar result holds for TAA, see Section 4.14.) 
Truth and falsehood. In C-KT4M, neither Tp nor T¬p is valid of any atomic sentence 
p. This is as it should be. The truth-regardless (truth tout court) and falsehood-regardless 
(falsehood tout court) of atomic sentences are not structural properties of the notion of truth. 
Even if we know that a sentence is nonparadoxical, we cannot infer its truth or its falsehood 
from that. Accordingly, even in the C- KT4M, truth and falsehood can only be defined relative 
                                                          
38
 The proposed theory shares the feature that the principle of bivalence and LEM come apart with some other 
theories of truth, such as supervaluationist ones (e.g., van Fraassen 1968 and 1970; also Fine 1975. 
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to a model: a sentence A is true-regardless (TA) in a model M precisely if it is bivalent and 
is valid-in-M (Result 6). From the definition of true-regardless, together with the notions of 
negation and circumstance-conjuncts, it results that a sentence A is false-regardless (T¬A) in 
a model M precisely if it is bivalent and its negation is valid-in-M (Result 7). This is in line 
with section 4.5 and so is also as it should be. 
 
4.13. KT4M as the Logic of Semantic Modalities and the Semi-
determinability of Truth 
As I said above, by analogy with the logics of logical modalities and of metaphysical 
modalities, KT4M can be called the logic of semantic modalities. This makes truth semantic 
necessity and bivalence semantic noncontingency. We can also say that KT4M defines the 
logical structure of truth. 
Assume (104) that it is the mark of a deflationary theory of truth that truth does not 
denote a real property of sentences (or propositions); or that there is no such thing as the 
nature of truth; or that saying that ‘snow is white’ is equivalent to ‘it is true that snow is white’ 
or to ‘“snow is white” is true’ exhausts what one can meaningfully say about the truth of 
‘snow is white’—and so for all sentences. Then we would expect deflationists to hold that 
TRIV is the modal system that captures the structure of truth and provides the logic of 
semantic modalities.
3946 This would be a modal way of expressing that the notion of truth has 
no content. The theory I propose is not a deflationary theory. It endows the notion of truth 
with content (as presumably would any modal logic stronger than TRIV). This content is 
entirely structural, but it is content nonetheless. Let me expound this content of truth in two 
steps. 
First, the content of truth can be said to be bivalence. As was mentioned in section 4.7, 
the negation of A’s being true-depending, or ŦA, is the bivalence of A. In modal terms, ¬ŦA 
expresses that either it is true that A or it is false that A. And this is precisely that A is bivalent. 
Making use of the interdefinability of T and Ŧ, one obtains the following account of truth: 
 
(15)  TA↔¬ŦA˄A 
 
                                                          
39 TRIV is any normal modal system that contains axiom K and in which □A↔A is a theorem. 
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Since KT4M can be defined with the basic operator Ŧ instead of T we can also express this as 
a definition of truth: 
 
(16)  TA =def  ¬ŦA˄A 
4047 
 
We can then say that every sentence TA has as its content bivalence, but not necessarily every 
sentence A does.48 
Second, the logical structure of bivalence qua content of truth is defined by the modal 
logic KT4M. What kind of structure does KT4M equip bivalence (and truth) with? The 
simplest way to understand this structure is as representing a kind of semideterminability, or 
more precisely proper semideterminability, with respect to bivalence (and truth) over classical 
logic as applied to the atomic sentences of the natural language fragment TL  with a truth-
predicate, where these atomic sentences include liar and truth-teller sentences. By proper 
semideterminability I mean the following:   
A class of questions is properly semideterminable if and only if there is a procedure 
that comes to a halt and says yes if the answer is positive, but there is no procedure that 
comes to a halt and says no if the answer is negative.
4149   
Rather than setting out a full mechanism that results in such proper semideterminability for 
bivalence and truth, I offer an informal description that relies on the partially interpreted 
possible-worlds semantics for C-KT4M from section 4.9. 
For (106) bivalence, the class of questions at issue asks of every sentence of TL  
whether it is bivalent. The procedure uses the partially interpreted semantics for C-KT4M 
given above. This assigns in every model to every atomic sentence p a circumstance-conjunct, 
and to every viewpoint in that model an assessment argument that assigns at that viewpoint a 
semantic value to p and then restricts consideration to the class of models in which each 
                                                          
40 Mutatis mutandis the same holds for falsehood. For a sentence ‘S’ to be false means that ‘S’ is bivalent and 
that it’s not the case that S. 
 T¬A =def ¬ŦA ˄ ¬A 
This follows from the modal definition of falsehood. 
41 Herzberger (1982, p. 496), introduces a relation very similar to (15) in his logic sketch in schema ii. He does 
not consider the question of the content of the notion of truth. 
42 Some will recognize this as the informal definition of non-decidable semidecidability or recursive 
enumerability. Here I am interested solely in this informal non-mathematical definition, hence the different term. 
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sentence letter in the interpretation is constantly through the models either given an 
assessment-sensitive or an assessment-insensitive sentence. If, on this semantics for the 
relevant subclass of models, for an A, the expression TATA can be shown to be valid, then 
A is bivalent, and the answer to the semi-determinability question is yes. For all assessment-
insensitive sentences this can be shown (Section 4.9). There is no corresponding procedure 
that rules out bivalence for sentences that are not bivalent, that is, for the argument-based 
assessment-sensitive sentences: since if ŦA, then ŦnA for any n, for no n can ŦnA come out as 
valid. So there is no procedure that results in a ‘no’ for these cases (sections 4.9 and 4.12).   
The case for the semideterminability of truth is similar. For truth, the class of questions 
at issue asks of every sentence of TL  whether it is true.  Since the semantic value of p depends 
on the circumstance-conjunct for p (to ascertain whether an atomic sentence p is true, we need 
to know whether things are as p says, and that is, we need to know the circumstance-conjunct 
for p), here the restriction is tightened further to a class of models of KT4M in which each 
atomic sentence of TL  is assigned the same circumstance-conjunct across models. If A is true – 
i.e. if we have TA – in every model of this set, then the semideterminability question is 
answered with yes. Since falsehood is defined as TA, indirectly it is also covered. Thus for 
assessment-insensitive sentences this procedure provides an answer. But again, there is no 
corresponding procedure that shows of sentences that neither are true nor have true 
contradictories in every model of this class that they are not true in this class of models. And 
that is, there is no procedure that results in a ‘no’ for such sentences. These sentences will be 
the assessment-sensitive ones. (This again reflects the deliberation from section 4.9)   
Reflections on the Liar Paradox thus result in a theory of truth that offers an 
explanation how the ‘nature’ of truth, or the content of the notion of truth, is a structural 
property, i.e. bivalence.  Bivalence itself is defined with the help of the modal system KT4M, 
and is semideterminable – as, consequently, is truth. Deflationary theories of truth turn out to 
be inadequate to capture truth. 
 
4.14. The T-Schema, Convention T, and Coherence 
How does the KT4M account of truth fare with regard to the T-Schema, which can be 
informally expressed as ‘‘⌜S⌝’ is true if, and only if, S’ where ‘⌜S⌝’ is the name of the sentence 
abbreviated as S? And how does it fare with regard to Tarski’s (107) Convention T, or 
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material adequacy condition, that any acceptable theory of truth needs to entail a sentence of 
the form of the T-Schema for every sentence S of the language at issue (where ‘⌜S⌝’ is the 
name of the sentence S in the metalanguage, with S being a translation of the corresponding 
sentence in the object language)? Since I express truth by means of an operator instead of a 
predicate, results can only be analogs to this requirement. 
KT4M directly provides the analogue to the left-to-right conditional of the T-Schema, 
since it contains axiom T. Axiom T holds for all sentences, including liar sentences. If it is true 
that (L) is false, then (L) is false. Whether (L) is false may of course be viewpoint-dependent. 
So may be whether it is true that (L) is false. 
The analogue to the right-to-left conditional cannot be derived in KT4M. For a liar 
sentence ⌜L⌝, one cannot rule out that L but not TL. So, one cannot prove that the T-schema 
does not hold for liar sentences. One cannot prove that the T-schema does hold for liar 
sentence either. Since, as intended, other than the PC tautologies, one cannot demonstrate 
anything for liar sentences within C-KT4M, the proposed theory entails that one cannot rule 
out that (the analogue to) the T-schema holds universally.
4355 
So, as in Herzberger’s revision theory (1982a, p. 493), in the theory presented here the 
T-schema cannot be shown to be valid. Unlike Herzberger’s, the theory does not entail that the 
T-schema is invalid. My view is that theories that satisfy Convention T get things wrong in the 
sense that they provide an idealization rather than a representation of truth in natural 
language. By contrast, the proposed theory gets things just right, because – given that Liar 
sentences are part of natural language – it is neither possible to show that the T-schema holds 
for all natural-language sentences, nor to show for any sentence that it does not hold for it. 
Among other things, the theory is a representation of this fact. Where the T-Conventioners 
provide an idealization of truth by removing some of its structural content, the present theory 
aims to provide a representation of truth, leaving that somewhat perplexing structural content 
in place. (How can I do this when I take liar and truth-teller sentences as atomic? By offering 
an axiomatic theory that describes the logical structure of their predicates.) 
The proposed theory thus stands to Tarski’s as follows. Both theories entail that it is 
not possible to show that Convention T holds for truth in natural language. Where Tarski 
                                                          
43
 Thus, unlike Liggins (2014), who suggests that the semantic-ascent half of the T-schema should be renounced, 
all I say is that judgment needs to be suspended regarding its validity. 
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states that Convention T does not hold for truth in natural language, the proposed theory 
suggests that this question is undecidable and commends suspension of judgement on the 
issue. As for coherence, I disagree with Tarski’s view that truth in natural language is 
incoherent and have given a formal (untyped) representation of truth in the natural-language 
fragment 
TL  that shows that it is coherent. My view is that what matters is not Convention T, 
but rather (i) that a coherent representation of truth can be given and (ii) that the T-schema 
fails for no other sentences than those nobody intentionally asserts (and even for those it fails 
only in the direction of semantic ascent). Point (i) has been shown. Point (ii) comes next. 
Liar (108) sentences can be described and picked out independently of the 
representation of truth by KT4M. They are self-referring sentences that predicatively self-
ascribe a semantic value that is incompatible with truth. It is a characteristic feature of all such 
sentences that nobody intentionally asserts them except, perhaps, hypothetically when 
contemplating or discussing liar sentences. (Why this is so is not my present concern.) Thus it 
is questionable whether there is any point in requiring a truth theory to be capable of showing 
that liar sentences satisfy the semantic-ascent half of the T-schema. 
In the C-KT4M (section 4.9), because of their viewpoint sensitivity, liar sentences are 
represented as (not shown to be!) the sentences for which ŦA holds. If one removes all such 
sentences from consideration, one obtains the fragment of  sentences for which TA˅T¬A is 
valid. In this fragment of KT4MT, given the definition of Ŧ, ¬TA and T¬A mutually entail each 
other, so that we have ¬TA↔T¬A. The semantic modality T then collapses and we obtain 
A↔TA.4456 In this trivial fragment, or trivialization, of KT4M, one can understand the T-
operator as ‘truth for use’, since arguably there is no use for liar sentences outside of the 
discussion of the liar paradox—and in such situations it is apt to employ KT4M as a whole. 
                                                          
44 
1. ¬TA↔T¬A 
2. T¬A→¬A 1, axiom T 
3. ¬TA→¬A 1, 2, definition of ↔ 
4. A→TA  3, contraposition 
5. TA→A  axiom T 
6 A↔TA  4, 5, ˄-introduction, definition of ‘↔’ 
Having A↔TA as a theorem in the trivial modal fragment, or trivialization, of KT4MT is not strictly the same as 
having the T-schema for the relevant sentences A. For this one needs to add that, for any sentence A we have ‘TA 
if and only if’ ⌜A⌝ ‘is true’. 
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